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Dear Allred

I hope you will like the play we gave
you speech in. I am attached advance
copy of our June issue. It should at
least prove that I warmly applaud it!
I have marked some other things that
may interest you.

Could your secretary fix an appointment
for me fairly soon if, as I hope, you are
now less pressed for time?

With best regards,

Sincerely

Plumbe Street

(EXECUTIVE REGISTRY FILE)

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Freedom & Union

MAGAZINE OF THE DEMOCRATIC WORLD

EDITOR, CLARENCE STREIT



SUMMIT

At the Summit - or Down to Earth ?

EDITORIAL -- Page 1

To Bar a New Yalta

By STEPHEN BORSODY -- Page 16



In this Issue...

At the Summit, or Down to Earth?—Editorial

Secretary Dulles gained a personal triumph when the NATO Council at Copenhagen backed his wise policy on the Kremlin summit talks. The Council also reversed itself by deciding to strengthen NATO's economic setup. The session left Dulles in better position to shift attention now to the true summit of democracy—the citizen—and bring about the proposed Atlantic Citizens Conference to explore unification at this basic level.

Explosive Turkey—Editorial

Over-expansion and inflation have produced an explosive situation in Turkey, the West's bastion in the Mideast.

Rotten in Denmark—and NATO—Editorial

The U.S., having many more cities and industrial areas near the coast, is more exposed to missiles launched from Soviet submarines, than long-range missiles (see also "Maps Make Missiles Need Overseas Bases," p. 14). But these submarines must first pass through the narrow straits controlled by Denmark—which permits no foreign NATO troops to defend them against sudden seizure by Russia. The Copenhagen NATO Council session overlooked this danger at its doorstep. To meet this threat Atlantic Union is required.

Atlantic Citizens Conference Backed by Senate Committee

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has reported favorably the resolution approving the Citizens Conference to explore Atlantic Union, which the NATO Parliamentarians recommended, amended, as suggested by the State Department, so that it no longer asks the President to act to bring it about. The text of the enacting clause and the committee's report are given.

Quo-Quiz . . . Who Said

Add to your stock of quotations by taking this test.

A Solution for North Africa?

John A. Marcum

To solve the North African problem three things, the author finds, are needed: One, a solution with no historical precedent; two, inventive and persuasive diplomacy; three, courageous action by the governments of France and North Africa. The U.S. can be a potent and constructive catalyst.

U.S. Science Lags Politically

Sidney Hook

Dr. Hook holds that U.S. science lags politically because of defects in the education of scientists.

Economic War is Soviet Aim

Allen W. Dulles

The author, director of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, believes the Soviets will not risk war, but will seek to win by economic and subversive arms. He warns that Russia's economic offensive is the "most serious challenge" the U.S. has "ever had to meet in time of peace." He gives impressive figures to back this statement.

These Indicators Point to Depression

Karl Karsten

The author, an economist who had long done research on economic prognosis, has worked out a system for forecasting, which, when back-checked over recent years, proved remarkably correct, as he shows with a chart. His three indicators, based respectively on commodity price-levels, industrial output, and common stock prices, point clearly to depression now.

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Maps Make Missiles Need Overseas Bases

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Bern Price

Neither the U.S. nor Russia can rely on today's maps to hit a target with long-range missiles. For the U.S. to shoot missiles with reasonable accuracy at Soviet Russian targets, bases have to be situated on Eurasia. (See also, "Rotten in Denmark," p. 3, for Russia's submarine advantage with missiles.)

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From the cave-dwellers on, man has been making maps—with many quaint results. Medieval map makers put Jerusalem in the center of the known world, and even gave the precise location of Paradise! To compare an old map with a modern one is to realize the strides that man has taken in mapping the world in which he lives.

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To Bar a New Yalta

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Stephen Borsody

The author, a former Hungarian diplomat, takes issue with George Kennan, Walter Lippmann and others, finding unrealistic their policy of "disengagement"—mutual East-West military withdrawal from Central Europe and neutralization of Germany. The Russians may give their own interpretation to this policy, as they did to the Yalta agreements. Disengagement would doom Western unity, and consolidate Communist domination of Eastern Europe. The true solution lies in strengthening Atlantic Unity.

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A German Economic Report

The Common Market of the Six Nations is in serious danger. French objections are blocking the British proposal to link it to a European Free Trade Area. The latter is more important than the former to German trade. If it is not established, Europe's system of multilateral trade and payments will be lost. Bonn should not sacrifice the Free Trade Area for the Common Market.

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Thomas J. Hamilton

Russia, inflated with technological successes, is showing less and less interest in reaching agreement on anything. It will no longer even discuss the German issue, professing that this is for the two German governments to decide. In the Mideast, Nasser's aims coincide neatly with Russia's. Apparently Russia proposes discussions only as propaganda.

France Offers Tourist "Beaucoup"

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Paul K. Martin

For those who plan their vacations, France will prove interesting and rewarding. This country has something for everyone, be he jazz fan, student of art, drama or architecture, or just out for a good time.

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Cover: Raffael Ganz

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Freedom & Union

"For the Great Republic, for the Principle it Lives by and Keeps Alive, for Man's Vast Future."—LINCOLN.

Vol. 13, No. 6



June. 1958

FREEDOM & UNION'S POLICY

To think, write and act always in terms of all the democratic world, and not of any one country in it.

To mean by "we" (except editorially) the citizens of the coming Atlantic Union or Federation of All the Free, not merely those of any existing democracy.

To speed its coming by helping its people understand better the principles of individual freedom and federal union, and their importance to peace, production, higher living standards and greater spiritual growth and happiness.

To advance it also by helping the people of this Free Atlantic Community to see that they do form a community which they need to govern democratically.

To provide a forum for all views in the vast field of freedom and federation.

To bring out the facts in this field by objective, imaginative research.

To favor calling now a federal constitutional convention, representing the experienced civil liberty democracies, to work out and submit to their people a plan for uniting them in a Federal Union of the Free, or United States of the Atlantic, under a Constitution that would: 1) guarantee their Bill of Rights; 2) give them a free government in those fields where they agreed this would best advance individual freedom; 3) provide that this government shall be elected by, be responsible to, and operate on, the citizens and be federally balanced in its representation of them; 4) secure the right of each nation in the Union to continue to govern all its other national affairs in complete independence.

To seek to extend the Union's free federal relationship to other nations peacefully and as rapidly as this will advance liberty and peace until eventually it grows into a free federal world republic.

To assure that, pending universality, this union shall be a loyal member of the United Nations.

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
OWEN J. ROBERTS, 1946-1955
 LOUIS DOMERATZKY HELEN B. HAMER

[On Second Thought]

In the Clouds, or Down to Earth— at Summit, or Sea-&-Citizen Level?

THE MINISTERIAL meeting of the NATO Council in Copenhagen in May was notable for three things—two plus and one minus. On balance they give Secretary Dulles the best position he has had since last Fall to retrieve his past mistakes—and do far more. He can now turn the spotlight from the sterile summit, where Moscow fixed it, to the fruitful ground, which the NATO Parliamentarians proposed, by bringing about their Atlantic conference to explore unity at freedom's basic level—the citizens. By so doing, Secretary Dulles can turn the tide of events—and change the course of history. Will he thus clinch enduringly his present ephemeral advantage? Or again tempt Providence with reckless caution?

There is no little drama in these times . . . and complete audience participation in the *dénouement*, whether it be a tragic or a happy ending.



—St. Louis Post-Dispatch

"Strength Enough if Pulled Together"

Two Cheers for NATO. The main thing the press generally noted about the NATO Copenhagen session was the unexpected triumph there of the policy toward the summit talks for which Secretary Dulles has so firmly and wisely stood, despite wide opposition and virulent criticism of him personally. But the Council meeting was noteworthy for two other things, widely overlooked.

*

Copenhagen paradoxically marked a considerable victory for Moscow, despite the Dulles triumph. For at that Council session it succeeded, even more than at the December one, in diverting the attention of the Council and the press to its summit red herring, and away from the dangerously overdue task of uniting the Atlantic community effectively to defeat Khrushchev's real strategy—that of winning the world by economic rather than military arms. On the other hand, the Copenhagen session did begin to see the light, for it quietly reversed the Council's long-standing "hands-off" policy in the economic field. The final communiqué not only stressed that co-operation here was "essential" but announced that "consultation on methods and machinery for such cooperation will take place within the alliance."

Still on the Defensive. The Copenhagen Council communiqué re-affirmed explicitly that NATO is a "defensive organization" while, implicitly, it gave renewed, and needless, proof that NATO is also on the defensive. In the military, scientific, disarmament and economic fields it is still the Kremlin that calls the tune and NATO that dances. NATO's "actions" continue to be only reactions.

June, 1958

Consider NATO's "challenge" to Moscow to enter into technical talks on measures to bar surprise attacks—to which even *The New York Times* devoted its entire report of the final result (without so much as mentioning, outside the communiqué text, the Council's economic decisions). This "challenge" was, at bottom, but a minor maneuver in response to the Soviet disarmament attack on the Cold War propaganda front.

From the Barren to the Basic. If the NATO Council had been imbued with some positive spirit of its own—some sense of leadership in setting today's values for the world—it had an excellent opportunity to show it at Copenhagen. It could have reduced its valuation of the importance of its agreement as regards summit talks to the low rating that history will give that topic—even a few months hence. It could have given its major attention, as the public does, to the problem of preventing Atlantic recession from sinking into depression.

The Copenhagen Council could have taken the lead definitely, shifting attention from the summit to sea level, from the talk in the clouds which the Communist dictator proposed to the creative Atlantic Citizens Conference which was urged on the Council last November by the Members of Parliament from all the NATO countries. It could have done this by deciding then and there to call this Conference to explore how to devise better machinery for common action by the Atlantic Community on its common economic, scientific, educational, military, diplomatic and other problems—including that of reaching and keeping a common policy toward the Communist empires. This alone would have put the Kremlin itself on the defensive.

Democracy's True Summit. What a stir the NATO Council could have made had it not only convoked the Atlantic Citizens Conference but seized the occasion to drive home the sharp contrast between Eastern dictatorship and Western democracy! Suppose it had pointed out that summit meetings come naturally to dictatorship which by its nature must insist that everything be decided at the top, but that the nature of democracy is to make the top depend on the bottom.

Democracy's true summits are not its presidents, prime ministers and secretaries of state but its citizens, whose serv-

ants its highest officials must remain if they are true to their trust.

*

The Atlantic democracies have not yet begun to talk on their own "citizen summit" level among themselves—even to explore how best to unite on that basis so that with one voice they would all speak to dictators. Instead of an Atlantic Union of 400,000,000 citizen "sum-

mits" who, by free majority rule, decide policy towards communism and other common problems—as each democracy does within its own borders—NATO is based on the ancient autocratic concept that the only important thing is the HEAD OF THE STATE. And so there are 15 sovereign voices at its Council table.

Mohammed Goes to Summit. At Copenhagen, it is true, all 15 NATO nations spoke with one voice to Moscow—but just why did they meet in Copenhagen? Because at the December Council session, Denmark (4.5 million citizens), supported by Norway (with still fewer citizens), had led in shifting the NATO spotlight to the Kremlin's summit proposal.

By giving an equal voice to its Danish "summit," its American "summit," its British "summit," and its French "summit," NATO makes one Danish citizen the equal not of one American (as in a Federal Union) but of 40 Americans, 12 Britons, 10 Frenchmen. NATO makes its Danish "summit" thus one of its highest. When this mountain refused to budge in December, the NATO Mohammed perforce went to the mountain.

The Copenhagen Council would have been noteworthy indeed had it used its opportunity to bring democracy back to its true summit, and to warn it against the sea of troubles that are inherent in NATO's present undemocratic set-up. It would not have lacked examples to point to. The troubles run, like the sea, from the Council's Danish doorsill all the way round to Turkey where they are perhaps more ominous now. Through them all runs the economic threat.

Turkey has long been Atlantica's strongest bastion in both the Balkans and Mideast. It is now in distress. It might well be the first NATO nation to crack in a prolonged U. S. slump, as Austria did in 1931. If so, the effects would be political, military and economic rather than monetary. But they would probably be even more disastrous and far-reaching than those of 1931.

Without a strong and sound Turkey, what would be left of the West's position as regards the Mideast and Iran, and the oil on which Western Europe's economy depends? But with Turkey—which has long led the Moslem world in democracy—solidly united to freedom and continuing its great advance, what solid hopes the West would have! Which will it be? Much depends on how much understanding attention we give Turkey now.

To Meet Economic Peril. The NATO Council's best achievement at Copenhagen was put thus in its communiqué:

"The foreign ministers recognized that political unity and the efficient organization of defense were not enough. Economic co-operation is also essential between the members of the alliance. Every effort should be made to insure economic prosperity, notably by the expansion of international trade and by aid to under-developed countries. Consultation on methods and machinery for such cooperation will take place within the alliance. The ministers attach special importance to the successful conclusion of the economic negotiations now being undertaken and to the establishment of close ties between the European countries* and the whole free world."

*See page 18 for the difficulties the negotiations for a "free market" in Europe now face.

To understand the importance of the Copenhagen decision to improve NATO's economic machinery, one needs to recall that the Report of the Committee of Three on strengthening NATO, which the Council approved in December 1956, said:

"Nor do there now appear to be significant areas for collective economic action requiring execution by NATO itself. In fact, the common economic concerns of the member nations will often best be fostered by continued and increased collaboration both bilaterally and through organizations other than NATO."

After quoting from this passage, I commented in the February 1957 *FREEDOM & UNION*: "This in face of all the evidence Moscow has given that it aims to win not through war but the 'inevitable capitalist struggle for markets,' and depression. The Report is as blind to this danger as the U. S. was to Pearl Harbor." It is reassuring to note that NATO is now awakening.

What Will Dulles Do Now? "Dulles fled here last night from Copenhagen," according to a United Press report from

Paris, as printed in the *Washington Post and Times-Herald*. So bitter was the criticism of him before that meeting that it apparently affected even the linotype machine and caused it to change *flew* to *fled*, despite the Secretary's undoubtedly personal success at Copenhagen. In stressing that success, the same paper expressed doubt of its solidity and hoped "the Secretary may be paving the way for some new move."

*

Lincoln felt that he needed to be strengthened by a victory before he could wisely issue his Emancipation Proclamation; after the victory at Antietam, he hastened to act. Similarly, Secretary Dulles may have felt that while all Atlantica seemed to be barking at him, it might do more harm than good for him to come out for the proposed Citizens Conference to explore Atlantic unification. But now that Copenhagen has given him a victory that has temporarily silenced his critics, he can safely get behind this move. Indeed, can he safely do otherwise?—C. K. S.

than Nazi Germany had to seize Denmark by surprise,* Denmark does not permit NATO to maintain any allied troops on its territory.

Butter . . . for Bombs. The submarine danger was incentive enough for NATO to seek to bring home NATO's importance to Denmark by having its Council meet in Copenhagen. Small wonder that Moscow should seek to neutralize Denmark, and should have tried to "butter it up" literally by offering—on the eve of the Council session—to buy more of its butter. This flexing of the Kremlin's economic muscles was a reminder of its special interest in Denmark, and the arms it can use in economic warfare; it was also a shrewd move on the propaganda front.

*

"Cannons, not butter," was the Nazi slogan. "Butter, not bombs," is the "peaceful" line taken by the Kremlin, now that it is well-stocked with bombs—and submarines—but needs to pass through a dairy country to get them out in the Atlantic . . . to strike suddenly at short-range at London, Paris, Hamburg, and from Montreal to New Orleans, Houston, and the Panama Canal.

Khrushchev's Chuckle. Despite the submarine problem at its very door, the NATO Council, when in Copenhagen, concentrated on pre-summit talks with Moscow aimed at measures to detect surprise attacks across the vast reaches of the Arctic by ICBM too inaccurate to be successfully used in the near future.

*

How it must make Khrushchev chuckle (amid all his troubles at home) to see the Atlantic Community press hail the Copenhagen Council as a NATO success, and overlook completely the Copenhagen Council's failure to tackle the submarine menace . . . let alone move to bolt the Baltic door—with Union.

It is true that much commendable progress toward unity has been made through NATO, and the recent session marked a further advance. It is also true that, so long as the Atlantic community is united only by alliance, this progress, at best, is fearfully inadequate. No one knows this better than Secretary Dulles—except Nikita Khrushchev.

CLARENCE STREIT

*For more about the Soviet submarine danger and the key role of Denmark, see "Can This David Match Goliath?" in the September 1957 *FREEDOM & UNION*.

June, 1958

THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS Committee has unanimously reported favorably to the floor the Green resolution (S. Con. Res. 62) for an Atlantic Citizens Conference to "examine exhaustively and to recommend how greater . . . unity . . . within the Atlantic Community may best be developed." This action was taken on April 24 after the Committee had weakened considerably the original text—whose chief sponsor was its chairman, Senator Theodore F. Green (D., R. I.)—by removing its request that the President get this conference convoked.

It replaced this with a statement that it was the sense of Congress that such a conference be called "at the appropriate time" without indicating who should take the initiative. This was done to meet the wishes of the State Department.

The preamble of the resolution, which was left unchanged, explained that the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference in Paris last Fall had recommended that their governments should call the kind of conference described above.* The Green text of the enacting clause read:

"Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring) That the President is requested to use his best efforts to supplement in cooperation with other governments of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization the recommendation and proposal of the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference as set forth in the above resolution adopted at the third annual conference in Paris on November 16, 1957."

This clause was amended to read:

"1. That it is the sense of the Congress that at the appropriate time a conference of leading representative citizens for the purpose set forth in the above resolution adopted at the Third Annual Conference of North Atlantic Treaty Organization Parliamentarians in Paris on November 16, 1957, would contribute to greater cooperation and unity of purpose among the member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

"2. The President is requested to arrange for the participation of private American citizens in any such conference."

The State Department objected to the original text on the ground that there

*See FREEDOM & UNION for December for text of NATO resolution and Senator Kefauver's commentary on it, and our March issue for Green resolution text.

Atlantic Citizens Conference Backed by Senate Committee

was "danger that new presidential initiative at this time would be interpreted as a lack of confidence on the part of the U. S. Government in efforts towards increasing Atlantic unity now being made through NATO and other projects such as GATT, the OEEC, the Coal and Steel Community, the Common Market and EURATOM. These are comparatively recent developments which hold good promise for the future." It added:

"The Committee may also wish to consider the strong possibility that governments may be unable to implement recommendations made by the proposed conference. If this should occur after the conference, consisting of at least in part officially appointed members, has been brought about through presidential efforts, the cause of Atlantic unity might well be retarded rather than advanced.

"In the opinion of the Department these risks can be avoided by rephrasing the operative paragraph of S. Con. Res. 62 along the following lines."

The text it then suggested was adopted without change by the Committee, except that it added the second section.

Since the State Department's text has thus been followed, and the resolution weakened, its supporters express confidence it will be passed by both Houses this session. The report which the Foreign Relations Committee adopted with the amended text is notable for emphasizing that the delegates to the conference, though officially appointed, would "act in accordance with their individual convictions," instead of being governed by official instructions, as in a diplomatic meeting. In bringing out the advantages of this system, which was followed at the Federal Convention in 1787—a fact which the report overlooks—it concludes:

"All wisdom does not lie in governments, and it is worthwhile to stimulate efforts to bring private talents to bear on" NATO's complex problems.

Senate Committee Report Text

The Committee on Foreign Relations, to whom was referred Senate Concurrent Resolution 62, a concurrent resolution to request the President to use his best efforts to bring

about a meeting of representative citizens from all the North Atlantic Treaty Organization nations to examine ways to promote greater cooperation among those nations, reports the resolution with amendments and recommends that, as amended, it do pass.

I. MAIN PURPOSE OF THE RESOLUTION

The main purpose of the resolution is to endorse the proposal of the Third NATO Parliamentarians' Conference that a conference of leading representative citizens of the NATO countries be held to explore methods of developing greater cooperation and unity of purpose within the Atlantic Community.

2. WHAT THE RESOLUTION DOES

The preamble of the resolution refers to, and quotes pertinent portions of, a resolution unanimously adopted by the Third NATO Parliamentarians' Conference in Paris in November 1957. This latter resolution recommended that the NATO governments—

in consultation with the Standing Committee and Political Committee of the Conference, bring about, in accordance with the constitutional and governmental processes of their countries, a conference composed of leading representative citizens selected on a nonpartisan basis and directed to convene as often as necessary in order to examine exhaustively and to recommend how greater cooperation and unity of purpose, as envisioned by the North Atlantic Treaty, within the Atlantic Community may best be developed.

It is contemplated that the members of the Conference would be private citizens who, "as far as possible," would be "officially appointed," but who would "act in accordance with their individual convictions." The findings and recommendations of the Conference would be reported to the appropriate committees of the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference, to the North Atlantic Council, and to the NATO member governments "for consideration and appropriate action in accordance with the constitutional processes of each member country."

The committee amendment would strike out all after the resolving clause and insert an expression of the sense of Congress that at the appropriate time such a conference "would contribute to greater cooperation and unity of purpose among the member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Or-

ganization." The committee amendment also adds a new section 2 requesting the President to arrange for the participation of private American citizens in any such Conference.

3. BACKGROUND AND COMMITTEE ACTION

The NATO Parliamentarians' resolution, which Senate Concurrent Resolution 62 endorses, originated in the Political Committee of the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference. Senator Kefauver served as chairman of this committee, and the other American members were Senator Saltonstall and Representatives Selden and LeCompte. The resolution was supported by the American delegation in Paris and was, as noted above, unanimously adopted by the Conference.

Senate Concurrent Resolution 62 was introduced February 13 by Senator Green, who had served as chairman of the American delegation in Paris, for himself and Senators Kefauver, Saltonstall, Jackson, Javits, and Humphrey. On March 11, Senators Kefauver, Saltonstall, and Javits discussed the resolution with the Committee on Foreign Relations in executive session. The committee further considered the resolution in subsequent executive sessions March 25 and April 15, and on April 22 voted, without objection, to report the resolution favorably with the amendment described above.

4. REASONS FOR ADOPTING THE RESOLUTION

In essence, Senate Concurrent Resolution 62, as amended by the committee, says two things: (1) Congress thinks a conference of the kind proposed would be useful, and (2) if such a conference is held, the President ought to arrange for American participation. The resolution basically is an expression of congressional interest in efforts to strengthen NATO unity.

The NATO Parliamentarians recommended that the proposed Conference be brought about by the NATO "governments, in consultation with the Standing Committee and Political Committee of the [NATO Parliamentarians'] Conference." Thus the next move is up to the designated committees. Senate Concurrent Resolution 62 does not call for American initiative; it does call for sympathetic reception of the initiative of others. Beyond requesting the President to arrange for American participation, the committee amendment leaves open all other questions.

As introduced, the resolution was subject to the objection that it was too specific in fixing responsibility for the initiative in the President. This objection is met by the committee amendment.

It might be further objected that the status of delegates to the conference would be ambiguous in that they would be "officially appointed" but would "act in accord-

ance with their individual convictions." This poses no real difficulty, however. There are ample precedents of conferences or advisory committees of private citizens who have been "officially appointed" but who have acted "in accordance with their individual convictions." Their recommendations have no force except that which inheres in their soundness and wisdom. And obviously, the membership of these groups has to be selected by somebody.

The committee sees no reason not to cooperate in holding the kind of conference proposed. *On the contrary, such a confer-*

ence could be expected to increase the NATO consciousness of the private citizens who participated and thereby indirectly of the public in the NATO countries. If valid, concrete recommendations result, so much the better. The committee desires to make it clear, however, that the conference will naturally have no power to take any sort of binding action.

All wisdom does not lie in governments, and it is worthwhile to stimulate efforts to bring private talents to bear on the complex problems which confront NATO. [All emphasis added.—EDITORS.]

Quoto Quiz - Who Said:

1. "Free people—those who enjoy individual and constitutional liberties—do not make aggressive war. . . . If only all these free people could stand together for the prevention of war as they do for the winning of a war!" —

2. "Transportation, education and rapid development of both spiritual and material relationships by means of steam power and the telegraph, all this will make great changes. I am convinced that the Great Framer of the World will so develop it that it becomes one nation, so that armies and navies are no longer necessary."

3. "We are an overseas people and we are dependent upon Europe for markets for the surplus products of our farmers and laborers. Without order in Europe we will at best have business depression, unemployment, and all their train of troubles. . . . Our expansion overseas has entangled us for good or ill, and I stand for an honest attempt to join with Europe's better spirits to prevent these entanglements from involving us in war."

4. "A people . . . which remain among the graves . . . and say, stand by thyself, come not near me; for I am holier than thou. These are a smoke in my nose. Ye shall all bow down to the slaughter . . . ye shall be hungry . . . ye shall be ashamed . . . and leave your name for a curse."

5. ". . . that whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new government."

6. "The importance of the Federalist papers is that they expose, from experience and with unanswerable argument, why sovereignty is an insuperable obstacle to the organization of peace, and why the federal principle is the only way forward."

7. "The first international commonwealth must from its nature be founded by states which have laid the foundation of effective self-government for themselves. They must be those national commonwealths which have carried self-government to the highest point which has yet been attained."

8. "Nationality does not aim either at liberty or prosperity, both of which it sacrifices to the imperative necessity of making the nation the mould and measure of the State. Its course will be marked with material as well as moral ruin."

9. "Thou art nothing, thy nation is everything."

10. "Man is not the enemy of man but through the medium of a false system of government."

Score yourself 10 for each quotation you correctly identify. A total of 30 is something to be proud of. If you get better than that, you have undoubtedly read *Union Now* retentively, for all these quotations are drawn from the many that are cited in the postwar edition of that book . . . which is available from FREEDOM & UNION, for \$1. Answers on page 24.

A Solution for North Africa?

By JOHN A. MARCUM

A LASTING SOLUTION for the quarrels between France and Tunisia will be possible only when there is a reckoning with the source of North African ferment—the Algerian Rebellion. The three and a half year old Algerian conflict confronts the West with the triple threat of a major rift in the Atlantic Alliance, the destruction of democratic institutions in France, and the alienation of all North Africa. Compounding the difficulties, public opinion in both France and North Africa seems to become less, not more inclined to compromise as the Algerian war continues.

Yet there remains at least one unexplored possibility for constructing a settlement upon the remaining foundation of deep, common interests and historical experiences which link France and North Africa. Required is one, a solution with no historical precedent and of no little complexity; two, diplomacy that is inventive and persuasive; and three, courageous action by the governments of France and North Africa to persuade their citizens to accept the solution.

Short term efforts to reduce tensions, such as American and British good offices, are necessary prerequisites to an overall settlement. But they may serve only to delay catastrophe unless followed up with an imaginative and comprehensive redefinition of France's relations with North Africa. To help further prepare the climate for a general settlement, the United States might:

One: Make a major effort to dispel real or simulated French mistrust of American economic ambitions in North Africa. It could pledge to complement the economic role of France, but not to replace it. Formal assurances that the U.S. will not use governmental pressure to establish an American economic hegemony in the area might help relieve exaggerated French fears and thereby promote the psychology of settlement. Two: Vigorously, but quietly encourage the French to import into North Africa

the creative concepts of integration and interdependence which have recast their relations with their traditional enemy, Germany. There is at least hope in actively supporting the idea of a North African Federation linked to France, the European Community, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Three: Offer a solid, tempting grant of economic assistance for the construction of a European-North African community. French and North African energies could then employ American capital to cooperatively exploit the wealth of the Sahara instead of employing American arms to kill each other.

The following blueprint for a solution to the North African Crisis is meant to be suggestive and flexible, not arbitrary. Should the formula help spur discussion of *interdependence*, it might help in a small way to create the conditions permissive of its realization.

One: *Internal sovereignty and self-government for Algeria*, achieved through French negotiations with representatives of the National Liberation Front, the trade union movement (UGTA) and a number of uncommitted elements, such as former Senator Kessous, editor of *La Communauté Algérienne*. This would permit the na-

tional aspirations of the Algerians to be realized in the customary way through their own government and flag. It would also require strong contracts guaranteeing the rights of the European and Jewish minorities.

Two: *Simultaneous establishment of a North African, or Maghreb Federation* composed of Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and, possibly, Libya. The Federation would unite the partially francoized countries of North Africa into one state by means similar to those recently employed in the federation of Iraq and Jordan. It would be up to the North Africans to decide how powers should be apportioned between the federal and provincial governments. And while the Federation might most conveniently take the form of a republic, the component states might retain traditional institutions. Thus Mohammed V could remain King and Imam of Morocco.

Three: *Simultaneous establishment of a French-North African Confederation*.

The governing organ might be a Common Council composed of representatives chosen in equal numbers by the governments of France and the Federation, who would in turn mutually agree upon three additional representatives to complete the Council's membership. The Council would have jurisdiction over such matters as: common policies of defense, coordination of foreign relations, control over labor migration and working conditions for North Africans employed in France, administration of an economic union, common exploitation of Saharan oil and other resources, surveillance over judicial, economic, educational, and other protective guarantees covering French citizens in North Africa, promotion of close cultural relations, and the definition of the obligations and privileges of a common Confederation Citizenship.

Four: *Simultaneous admission of the North African Federation as an equal partner into the three institutions of the European Community*—Coal and Steel, Common Market, Atomic Energy. In effect, this would be a step toward creating a Eurafrican community. To help render participation by North Africa beneficial to the North Africans as well as to the Europeans, the U.S. should join the European members in setting up a special Investment Fund to develop local industry and commerce, and thus raise living standards in North Africa.



—Fischer, N.E.A. Service

Five: Simultaneous admission of the North African Federation as an equal partner into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Such military bases as Bizerte and the U.S. airfields in Morocco should be placed under the command of SHAPE or a new Mediterranean-North African Command. North African military leaders and units should be given an equitable participation in the Atlantic Defense structure. And an infrastructure program, which would incidentally benefit the area's economy by improving communications, might be launched in order to improve the defense system of the Federation.

Such a package deal, involving five levels of "interdependence," should not be a cloak for a new type of "European" colonialism. It would have to be negotiated on the basis of a genuine dedication to supranational solutions on the part of freely associated equals. It would necessarily respect the political rights and sensitivities of both Africans and Europeans. In this way it could serve the interests and aspirations of all concerned.

But is such a complicated scheme and effort really necessary to solve the North African crisis?

U. S. Helped Produce Crisis

Until now, the U.S. has persistently avoided any involvement in the Algerian question. Solicitous of harmony within the Atlantic Alliance, the American government has limited itself to not very convincing professions of faith in the ability of the French, through wise and liberal policies, to solve the Algerian problem themselves.

The bombing of Sakiet-Sidi-Youssef, and the rapid deterioration of Franco-Tunisian relations forced the U.S. off its perch of non-involvement. The very "hands off" policy which caused it to trust in French judgment has helped to produce the crisis which has forced it in the imbroglio at a point when the prospects for reason and negotiations are scarcely favorable.

The French air raid against the Tunisian border village was the natural result of bitter frustration and resentment over Tunisian aid which has helped protract the Algerian Rebellion into an apparently endless, indecisive war. With dedication to the cultural absurdity and legal fiction that "Algeria is France," the French have stubbornly clung to their last foothold in North Africa. At



Scott Long, Minneapolis Tribune
It's the rage in Paris.

stake are: the security of a million French-Algerians with large farm and commercial investments; some 850,000 square miles of territory which link France to the vast federations of West and Equatorial Africa; the highly publicized prospects of a French "Far West" in the oil and mineral rich Sahara; and the prestige and very existence of France as an African power. The blood and sweat of half a million French soldiers represent the measure of the French commitment. No French government could avoid a parliamentary guillotine if it did not react firmly against all outside assistance to the Algerian Army of National Liberation.

Despite material accomplishments under French rule, the Algerians have grown increasingly resentful of their economic, social, and political inferiority to the French. The bulk of the Algerians either support the small forces of the rebellion or remain passive. Their attitude leads to predictions of a long war of attrition. National feeling, cultural awareness, and the attraction of the Cairo brand of pan-Arabism tend to grow as the combat continues. The

Algerians are no more disposed than the French to lay down their arms.

Tunisian sympathy for fellow Moslems in Algeria struggling for the independence which Tunisia already enjoys is likewise understandable. The Neo-Destour government of President Bourguiba might find itself overthrown by popular reaction and the extremist forces of Cairo-exile Salah ben Youssef should it fail to react strenuously to French military incursions. The Tunisian government most likely would not dare to negotiate a settlement which would cut off its aid to the Algerian rebels. Demands for the withdrawal of all French troops from Tunisia and the closing of a number of French consulates are but portents of the pattern that the Algerian conflict imposes upon Franco-Tunisian relations. Continued border raids, reprisals, rising emotions, and eventual elimination of French economic and cultural interests in Tunisia may be anticipated.

The danger of a similar deterioration in Franco-Moroccan relations is inherent in the Algerian war. The Moroccans are also funneling arms to the Algerian nationalists. "Interdependence," a close economic and cultural cooperation, was envisioned as the basis for French relations with Morocco and Tunisia following the grant of independence to the former protectorates. But the Algerian war has relentlessly estranged all North Africa from France. Morocco, for centuries a cultural recluse behind its Atlas fastnesses, has begun to turn from its recently forged western affiliations toward a xenophobic, expansive nationalism. This is embodied in Allal-el-Fassi's movement for a Greater Morocco, including all French Mauretania, Spanish Rio De Oro, and other Saharan territories totaling many times the size of present-day Morocco. The Moroccan Liberation Army of the Sahara promises to become an increasingly grave threat to the French position in the Sahara and to compound the difficulties of the French military campaign in Algeria.

But as indicated earlier, there is at least one positive basis for agreement in North Africa. As a result of the impact of French administration and education, there is still an impressive amount of good will toward France to be found among the present national leaders of

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Tunisia, Morocco, and even Algeria. The longer the Algerian war continues the more this sentiment is compromised and eroded.

During the summer of 1956, Tunisian Secretary of State Hajeri of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, expressed the hope that "interdependence" between France and Tunisia would develop to a high level of cooperation. A few months later he was severely wounded by French gunfire during an inspection of the Algerian-Tunisian border. Also in the summer of 1956, the Tunisian ambassador to Cairo, Dr. Salok Mokkadem, made plain his dislike of the dictatorial and expansive features of Nasser's government and expressed strong sympathy for the West. Now as foreign minister, he must seek the aid of all Arab-Asian states in a bitter struggle against France. President Bourguiba, himself, has repeatedly indicated a willingness to associate Tunisia with the North Atlantic Alliance. Yet now his political survival depends upon public denunciation of and actions against French colonialism.

We must act swiftly to halt the spiral of violence—or leave the Communists and ultra-nationalists of both sides to reap the harvest of hate and bloodshed. The U.S. can no longer find refuge in a do-nothing policy. Its very refusal to interfere so as to avoid making a choice between France and North Africa, will be convincing proof to the North Africans that indeed it has interfered and has chosen—France. To North African eyes U.S. helicopters, jeeps, and guns will serve as visible evidence of its choice. Any attempt merely to patch up Tunisian-French relations by border commissions and the like is doomed to be skewered on the sword of Algeria.

A gargantuan diplomatic effort and ambitious formula is clearly necessary to end the tragic course of conflict and destruction in North Africa. By dispelling fears of American economic aggrandizement, by urging a five-level supranational solution, and by offering economic assistance for the construction of a European-North African community—in short by being a potent and constructive catalyst, the U.S. may rise to the creative and effective role required of it. The only alternative left is to continue to remain a frustrated spectator of despair and slaughter.

ECONOMIC WAR IS SOVIET AIM

By ALLEN W. DULLES

Director of the U. S. Central Intelligence Agency

TO DAY THE SOVIET UNION through its very vocal leader, Khrushchev, is directly challenging the U.S. in the fields of industrial development and foreign trade and aid as well as in military matters.

The economic challenge is a dual one. They are setting goals for their own domestic production to compete directly with our own and to quote their words, "to get ahead of us in the economic race." The other phase of their challenge is through their foreign economic penetration program. I shall discuss both of these challenges. Of course, I do not mean to discount the seriousness of the Soviet military threat or its challenge in the scientific and technical fields on which advanced weapons systems depend. But as I see it, under its present policies, the U.S.S.R. does not intend to use its military power in such a way as to risk war. They have a healthy respect for our retaliatory capability.

Furthermore, the Soviet success with Sputniks and in the field of ballistic missiles has well alerted us to the military danger and our missile and other programs are receiving top priorities. We must, however, be ever watchful of the Soviet emphasis on the military application of science and technology in order to anticipate any attempts at a breakthrough which would change the balance of military power.

Barring such a possibility, it is most probable that the fateful battles of the cold war will, in the foreseeable future, be fought in the economic and subversive arenas.

Since 1928 the Soviet Union has developed rapidly from a predominantly agricultural and industrially underdeveloped country to the second largest economy in the world. Forced draft industrialization continues in Russia today, and now the emphasis is more positive: namely, to meet Khrushchev's goal of, "catching up and surpassing the U.S. in per capita production within the shortest possible historical period of time." This theme is being used not only as internal propaganda but also to propagate the Soviet faith abroad.


Comparison of the economies of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in terms of total production of goods and services indicates the U.S.S.R.'s rapid progress.

Whereas Soviet gross national product was about 33 per cent that of the U.S. in 1950, by 1956 it had increased to about 40 per cent, and by 1962, it may be about 50 percent of our own. This means that the Soviet economy has been growing, and is expected to continue to grow through 1962, at a rate roughly twice that of the economy of the U.S. Annual growth over-all has been running between six and seven per cent, annual growth of industry between 10 and 12 per cent.

These rates of growth are exceedingly high. They have rarely been matched in other states except during limited periods of postwar rebuilding.

A dollar comparison of U.S.S.R. and U.S. gross national product (GNP) in 1956 reveals that consumption—or what the Soviet consumer received—was less than half of total production. It was over two-thirds of the total in the U.S. Investment, on the other hand, as a proportion of GNP in the U.S.S.R., was significantly higher than in the U.S. Furthermore, investment funds in the U.S.S.R. were plowed back primarily into expansion of electric power,

This is the slightly condensed text of a speech Mr. Dulles gave at the annual meeting of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States in Washington, D. C., April 28.



- Hesse, The Saint-Louis Globe Democrat

the metallurgical base, and into the producer goods industries. In these fields, it was over 80 per cent of actual U.S. investment in 1956, and in 1958, will probably exceed our own. Defense expenditures, as a proportion of GNP in the U.S.S.R., were significantly higher than in the U.S.; in fact about double.

Soviet industrial production in 1956 was about 40 percent as large as that of the U.S. However, Soviet heavy industry was proportionately larger than this over-all average, and in some instances the output of specific industries already approached that of the U.S. Output of coal in the U.S.S.R. was about 70 percent of that of the U.S., output of machine tools about double our own and steel output about half.

Since 1956, Soviet output has continued its rapid expansion. In the first quarter of 1958, Soviet industrial production was 11 per cent higher than a year ago. In comparison, the Federal Reserve Board index shows a decline of 11 per cent in the U.S.

According to available statistics, in the first quarter of 1958, the Sino-

Soviet Bloc has for the first time surpassed the U.S. in steel production. The three months figures show that the U.S.S.R. turned out over 75 per cent of the steel tonnage of the U.S.

A recession is an expensive luxury. Its effects are not confined to our own shores. Soviets propagandists have had a field day in recent months, pounding away at American free enterprise.

Every Soviet speech, magazine article, or radio broadcast beamed to the under-developed nations plays up and exaggerates our economic difficulties. The uncommitted millions are being told by the Communists—"see, we told you so. Crises and unemployment are inevitable under capitalism. Communism is the only true road to social progress." Our economy is giving the Communists a propaganda target as damaging, and I trust, as transitory as their Sputniks.

Continued Soviet industrial growth has had a counterpart in increased trade with the free world. Over the past two years, their trade with the West has been moving ahead far more rapidly than it has within the Bloc itself. About 70

percent of the U.S.S.R.'s increase in non-Bloc trade in 1957 was with the industrial nations of Western Europe and, under agreements such as that just concluded with Germany, will expand still more.

Recent speeches by Soviet leaders—Khrushchev, Mikoyan, and Deputy Foreign Minister Zaharov—stress the U.S.S.R.'s desire to expand trade with the Free World.

Soviet capabilities to export petroleum and metals—aluminum, tin, zinc, and ferro-alloys—is increasing. The U.S.S.R. is already a supplier in a few traditional Western metal markets. Over the years, the U.S.S.R. may well become a major source of many such industrial necessities to Western Europe.

This seems particularly likely if Khrushchev's 1972 commodity goals prove to be realistic. Take, for example, petroleum. By 1972, the Soviets plan to produce as much crude oil as we in the U.S. do today. Even allowing for substantial increases in domestic consumption, they could export about 2 million barrels a day. Today, all of Western Europe consumes about 3 million barrels a day.

A start has already been made on the pipeline needed to bring the crude oil from the Ural-Volga basin to the Baltic.

Soviet ability to use trade as a weapon to advance its political aims will increase in a direct ratio to their success in realizing their economic goals.

For example, once they have penetrated Western European markets to the extent that these markets become substantially dependent on Soviet industrial raw materials, they will have available a new and formidable weapon of economic warfare. By withholding supplies, by capriciously raising prices, or by dumping commodities, the Soviets in effect will have a seat at the council table of the great industrial nations of Europe.

During the Suez Canal crisis, we saw a brief glimpse of Soviet capabilities to grant or withhold economic favors through the forms of its own petroleum exports.

Further, their governmental set up is well adapted to waging economic as well as political warfare. They have no budgetary controls when it comes to diverting funds to particularly urgent national policies. There need be no prior consultations with parliaments or the people.

This, briefly described, is the Soviet economic base and foreign trade program. It is to this base that Moscow is adding its foreign economic penetration deals designed to wean to its camp the uncommitted and newly developing areas of the world.

It is important at the outset to note that Soviet credits and grants are not limited to those countries where there is an early prospect of acceptance of Communist doctrine.

Soviet "Aid" and Trade

Of the \$2 billions of development and military aid extended by the Sino-Soviet Bloc over the past three years—and this is exclusive of *intra-Bloc* aid which is a substantial drain on Soviet economy—large sums have gone to countries outside the Soviet camp.

Let us get down to cases: In Egypt the Communist party was outlawed at the time of the Bloc's original military aid offer in 1955. Despite repeated crackdowns on Communist elements within the country since that time the U.S.S.R. concluded a \$175,000,000 economic aid program with Egypt in 1957.

Communist influence in Syria has been reduced following its membership in the United Arab Republic in February of this year—even to the point where Khalid Bakdash, the leading Arab Communist, fled the country. But the U.S.S.R. is going ahead with its \$170,000,000 economic aid program and continues to supply arms under agreements worth \$100,000,000. The magnitude of this and other military programs raises the question as to who may be the eventual user of these arms.

Afghanistan is a monarchy. The Imam of Yemen is an absolute ruler. Both are recipients of large Soviet aid programs.

Soviet Bloc economic penetration of Yemen provides a striking instance of the use of trade and aid as an investment in disorder. Yemen is strategically located at the entrance to the Red Sea from the Gulf of Aden. It commands one entrance to all Suez Canal traffic; the oil moving westward as well as goods moving from Europe to the East.

Soviet overtures were appealing to the Imam because the Bloc was willing to supply him with arms, while the West would not. Arms in Yemini hands on the scale contemplated can only create more trouble in the Middle East.

They will fan the Imam's dispute with the British and with local Sultanates over the borders of the Aden Protectorate.

The Soviets were quick to sense the opportunity to create disorder by giving aid to Yemen. They moved quickly. In less than two years, this small country of some four millions of people has been granted \$80 million in credits. Additional offers over \$20 millions are currently outstanding. Arms valued at \$30 millions have been delivered. A Soviet and Czech military mission of some 65 advisors is currently in Yemen for training assistance.

Even the Red Chinese have joined in with an offer of a loan of \$15 millions. If all proposed projects are carried out, the Communists will play a key role in Yemen's economic as well as military development.

The Communists have no interest rate problems. They have no legislative restrictions. The U.S.S.R. has developed an attractive package credit deal—long term loans, generally for 12 years; 2½ per cent interest rates; repayment in surplus commodities, and room for bargaining on prices. They have devoted much effort to the native language training of the technicians they send with their aid to the newly developing nations.

Though the Communists eschew capitalist types of business organizations in their own country, they make liberal use of them abroad.

One of the most important of these is the Bank of China. It is a primary source of funds to the 12,000,000 Chinese in Southeast Asia. These loans, controlled from Peiping, often require appropriate gestures of support to the Communist regime in China. Branches of the Bank throughout the East promote the export and sale of Chinese Communist goods in the area. They also collect a vast store of economic and political information, both openly and by clandestine means.

In Paris, for its European business, the Soviets use a commercial bank called the Banque Commerciale pour l'Europe du Nord. It often serves as agent for effecting sales of Soviet gold in London and on the Continent and is the means through which Soviet credits are transferred to the satellites. It also maintains a widespread system of correspondent relationships with banking institutions

throughout Europe and in this Hemisphere and is one of the chief instruments for the financing of Soviet trade with the West and for obtaining information on trade opportunities.

In Latin America, there are a number of Communist front or Bloc associated organizations actively campaigning for closer commercial ties with the Bloc. In Brazil, one of these has been offering to import and sell Russian automobiles at ridiculously low prices. When this fell through, it offered to import a complete auto factory from the U.S.S.R. While neither offer may have been serious, they had considerable propaganda value.

The Strings Attached are Invisible

Moscow's foreign aid program has particular appeal in the underdeveloped countries because Russia until so recently was an undeveloped country itself. For some reason the recently liberated countries seem to feel that the Kremlin has found a new and magic formula for quick industrialization which is the hallmark of becoming a modern state to many of these countries. They recognize American economic and industrial leadership in the world but they feel that the democratic process of economic development may be too slow.

Soviet propaganda charges that it took the West 150 years to achieve industrially what the Soviets have built in a generation. In the newly developing countries, the drive for economic betterment has become a crusade, not always based on reason.

Also these countries feel that we in the U.S. are far ahead of them and that while they may aspire eventually to an economy something like that of the Soviet Union, they cannot, in the foreseeable future, hope to reach the high standards of living of this country.

Factors such as these give a particular appeal to overtures from the Soviet Union. They are not able to see the invisible strings which are tied in with Soviet offers nor do they understand the subtle implications of Soviet subversive penetration which is part of every economic package.

Each time that I prepare a summary of any phase of Soviet activities, whether it be in their domestic industrial development, their foreign economic exploitation activities, or their military defense preparations, I am impressed by the

efforts which the Soviets make to keep secret the details of their operations.

If their motives in the military, industrial and economic fields, are, as they claim, peaceful and defensive, why should this be the case? Why are we not entitled, before we accept their protestations regarding peaceful coexistence, to ask that there should be a franker disclosure of their activities—something comparable to the disclosure made by the free countries of the world?

For example, before their recent offer of a suspension of nuclear testing, they themselves had just completed a series of nuclear tests, concentrating a great number of tests in a short period of time. Three tests occurred within a single two-day period in an unprecedented burst of activity. This was done behind a cover of secrecy except for announcements that our government itself made of the Soviet tests. But, by and large, their activities in nuclear testing remain quite unknown particularly in those countries which are being filled with Soviet propaganda against testing.

The nature of their military aid programs such as I have described above have, by and large, been kept as secret as the Soviets could manage. An even tighter veil of secrecy is kept around almost all of their military establishments.

The details of our own programs as well as of defense expenditures and military production, with few exceptions, are available to the world through our newspapers. In contrast, the Soviets release only the annual ruble total of what they call defense spending.

It is our best estimate that the announced Soviet defense budget as published to the world actually covers little more than half of the rubles they are now putting into military activities.

As long as this secrecy remains a cardinal tenet of Soviet practice it is extremely difficult to accept Soviet protestations of a desire for peaceful relations as expressing their real intentions.

Undoubtedly one of the reasons for secrecy is to hide from the world some of the problems which the Soviet Union faces. The realization of many of the goals they have set depends on resolving some very real obstacles to success.

For example Khrushchev has repeatedly promised his people startling improvements in the quality of their diet. The realization of these dreams rests on a precarious agricultural base, whose



crops over large areas, as we saw in 1957, are vulnerable to serious drought. Further, Khrushchev has brought the anti-geneticist Lysenko back into favor, a theorist whose plant and animal breeding ideas are regarded as nonsense by all competent Western scientists.

They are now engaged in a reorganization of the control of their industry and this move toward decentralization has built-in, long-run dangers for any dictatorship such as that of the Kremlin.

Ruble Value is Uncertain

The myth of collective leadership has been abandoned and there are signs today of a reversal to a harsher line with consequences of a far-reaching nature. Khrushchev, despite his gregarious characteristics, as he assumes new positions of power and eliminates his rivals, becomes more and more an isolated and lonely figure.

As they enter into the field of international trade on a major scale they lack a convertible currency. They must rely on the device of settling international balances in sterling or dollars. In essence, most of their trade must remain on something approaching a barter basis. The ruble is not an international currency and within wide ranges its value is a matter of speculation, varying from the official rate of around 20¢ to a purchasing value of around 10¢, to a quoted value for a ruble note in the Swiss market of only a few cents. But, of course, this latter rate is due to the fact that ruble currency can neither be legally imported into nor exported from the Soviet Union.

Possibly today the most acute problem

facing Khrushchev is that of meeting the growing demands of the Russian consumer for a greater share in the overall production of the Soviet Union.

With a gross national product of around 40 per cent of our own, they put into the military sector a national effort roughly comparable to our own, leaving only a modest share for consumer goods.

If the Kremlin responds to popular pressures, they will be forced to give more and more to the consumer. This trend has already started. The Russians have somewhat improved living standards and the national output of such consumer goods as TV sets and washing machines has been stepped up. Some former armament plants are now producing civilian goods.

All this may help to develop a society where people will have more opportunity to satisfy the individual yearning for a fuller life. Economic betterment, added to the massive educational system they have already installed, may help to build up generations of people more and more inclined to question the basic tenets of a totalitarian philosophy and less willing to tolerate the autocratic forms of their government.

Under Khrushchev there has been, undoubtedly, some relaxations of the old Stalinist police system, but every two steps in advance seem to be followed by one step backward as they wrestle with the problem of reconciling a measure of freedom with the stern line of communist doctrine and discipline.

The fact that the leadership of the U.S.S.R. faces these very real problems is, however, no excuse whatever for complacency on our part. During and since the war, their leadership has faced even more serious problems and has surmounted them. The economy of the Soviet Union has momentum and versatility and, while I predict that their people will undoubtedly press for an improvement of their lot, some real concessions can be made to them without fundamentally altering the general tempo of their present industrial and military programs.

Certainly here we have the most serious challenge this country has ever faced in time of peace. As this challenge is very largely based on the economic and industrial growth of the Soviet Union, it is one which concerns directly the business leaders in our country.

June, 1958

These Indicators Point to Depression

By KARL KARSTEN

FORMULAS FOR FORECASTING the U. S. economy, which have proved impressively accurate when back-tested, have been pointing increasingly for the past two years to impending economic disaster. These storm-warnings have now reached a degree which reminds one only too clearly of the 1929 crash. The accompanying chart tells the story graphically in three pairs of curves, each correlating forecast and fact every year from 1919 or 1920 to 1958.

They result from forecast methods based on principles that I first worked out in the 1920s, and have since re-checked in the light of the experience of 20 of the past 38 or 39 years. The resulting formulas were then applied to the data of the remaining 18 or 19 years to test them.

I would make clear at once that, for the years prior to 1955, the term "forecast" is used in a special sense. I did not use the formulas in any of these years to forecast what would occur the next year—as I have done since 1955. Instead, I took the formulas I had established on a 20-year basis of experience, and applied them to the data available in each of the remaining 18 or 19 years to show what a technician using these formulas—say in 1929—would have forecast then for the following year(s). Before explaining my forecasting system, however, I would stress its purpose.

When your doctor tells you that unless you reform you are going to become a very sick man, he is warning you of dangers ahead which he hopes, and you hope, you will find ways of avoiding. If you say he is making a prediction or forecast, it is only fair to add that he desires you to prove it wrong.

The function of economic prognosis is to give similar warnings in its field. It can tell only what will happen if we do not take the necessary preventive measures. If it predicts the fluctuations of what used to be called "the business cycle," it deals only with major causes which have operated in the past. Like

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tide-tables which do not allow for winds and other temporary factors, it foretells when and how, other things being equal, the economic tide will flow or ebb. And if a depression is impending, it should give us storm-signals in advance which will enable us to change course and avoid the storm area, or trim ship and reduce the storm's dangers.

As yet no disaster so severe as here pictured has developed. The wholesale price index (and the cost of living) have risen instead of fallen, and it would take a 15 or 20 per cent decline to bring them down to the forecast. Industrial production is off a little, but not as sharply as is forecast. In the stock market the price-level has sagged a little, but the forecast has tobogganed 40 per cent.

What do these storm signals mean when the storm they predict has not yet broken upon us? Do they show that our boasted "built-in" preventives of depression, plus a slight official softening of interest rates, have proved so effective as remedial measures that a repetition of 1929 has been, is being, and will be, averted?

Or do they mean that psychological and other short-term factors have given a temporary appearance of strength and deceptively sustained the inflationary waves, so that the crash, when it comes, will be all the more drastic and violent? Will every week and month that we delay in preparing to cope with disaster only add to the magnitude of the ultimate break?

On this question there will naturally be wide divergences of opinion. And

opinions lie outside the scope of this article. It deals only with the impersonal, non-opinionative findings about the future which can be gleaned from purely empirical analysis of economic inter-relations which have consistently occurred in the past.

The curves have been carried back as far as data are available. It is believed that the past third of a century includes so rich a variety of economic conditions as to afford a very thorough experimental testing ground.

The great advantage of such "barometric" series as these "forecasting curves" is that they are statistically determined measures of what has actually been reported in each previous year in the data of logically related economic conditions, empirically selected for their proven past tendencies to combine in anticipating the facts of the coming year.

And it is important, therefore, to challenge these "forecasting" curves on the ground that their components may have been selected on the basis of purely "random" or chance co-variations. How much trust or confidence are we to place in such indicators or predictions?

Certainly one should not judge their significance by a single year's performance, but by a number of experiences. It was precisely to provide a large number of these that formulas used in constructing the white curves were each derived from study of 20 of the 38 or 39 available years—entirely without reference to the remaining years. They were thereafter applied to the latter for testing purposes.

The "forecasts" for these testing years provide the necessary check against randomness, since by definition if the component series were random series with fortuitous correlation, they would have little correlation outside the years from which their formulas were derived.

These testing years include all the war years and some depression years. They can be expected therefore to show some decline in the closeness of fit and correlation to the facts, due to the difference between peace-time and war-time economics. But in direction of change from year to year, which is the important thing, two of the three forecasting curves are right during these testing years, as often as, or more often than,

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in the years on which their formulas were based. By these means the technician assures himself that there has been no circular argument in these prognoses.

After satisfying himself that the results are not fortuitous, one can proceed to measurement of the degree of accuracy achieved in these forecasts. The chart shows how widely they differ. The most familiar measure is called the "coefficient of correlation." Up to 1956 the correlation coefficients between the logs of fact and forecast were as follows:

Commodity price-level
(for 30 peace-time years) .993 correlation
Industrial output
(during total 37 years) .981 correlation
Common stocks price level
(for 29 peace-time years) .981 correlation


These coefficients are considered to indicate that the results are those which are to be expected if the following measured portions of the causes were reflected in the forecasts, namely:

Commodity price-level
(peace-time only) .99% of causes
Industrial output
(peace and war years) .87% of causes
Common stock prices
(peace-time only) .96% of causes

As these figures include the years from which the formulas were developed, it is obvious that, for the testing years alone, they would be somewhat lower. But this refinement would involve relying upon relatively small series of observations. Many technicians might consider it unnecessary, since the correlations are so extremely high as to constitute impressive evidence of the probability that the forecasts will not lack significance in the present or in future years.

Two conclusions stand out from these forecasts for the layman and for the statesman and the administrator. The first is obvious, that we must hope and pray the forecasts will prove wrong this time. The second, and more useful, conclusion is that we should not depend on that happy chance, but should, with utmost speed, take all the precautionary and preventive steps we can (a) in domestic affairs to prevent a major depression and disaster, and (b) in foreign affairs to prepare ourselves and the world to weather it as well as possible if and when that disaster comes. The time to act is "in the calm" before the storm.

In the accompanying chart the top curves deal with the commodity price level. The black curve traces the annual averages of the U. S. Department of Labor wholesale price-index of all commodities (100 = 1947-49) for the last 39 years. The white curve failed to account for the high prices at the end of World War I and points to higher prices than were allowed during the period of price control under O.P.A. in



World War II, a divergence which was closed when price control ended.

The middle black curve traces the annual averages of the Federal Reserve Board index of the physical volume of industrial production (100 = 1947-49). The bottom black curve traces the annual averages of Standard and Poor's index of the prices of 480 common stocks (100 = 1935-39) with its new index of 500 stocks spliced

thereto after 1955.

Each forecasting curve, that is, white curve, is plotted in a "lagged" position; its points are not plotted in the years of the data from which they are computed, but are plotted one year later, in the years of the data for which they are intended to serve as predictions. Each forecasting curve is based on its own formula, unchanged throughout its entire length.

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Maps Make Missiles Need Overseas Bases

By BEM PRICE

Associated Press Writer

WITH TODAY's maps, neither the U. S. nor Russia could hit the broad side of a barn with a 5000-mile-range missile—but they might get close.

In fact, so far as is known publicly, the U. S. does not know with precision the location of Moscow in relation, say, to the Air Force's intercontinental missile (ICBM) base being built near Cheyenne, Wyo.

Pinpoint accuracy was no great problem in World War II. Today, matters are different. Unless combatants learn to shoot long-range missiles with near pinpoint accuracy, substituting blast effect for radioactivity, they could wind up destroying themselves [and] the enemy.

Even if maps were extremely accurate, the missile men still are confronted with problems over which they have no control. Cross winds of 250 miles per hour or more at high altitudes undoubtedly would affect the missile's trajectory.

UNTIL THE ADVENT of guided missiles as offensive and defensive weapons, laymen took the accuracy of maps pretty much for granted. Maps are usually such commonplace things that we seldom consider the labor that has gone into them.

Only by comparing an old map with a modern one can you really appreciate the work that has been done by our modern cartographers to make the average atlas as accurate and up-to-date as possible. An atlas is a collection of maps—almost always a complete set that maps the entire world. The name derives from the Greek titan, Atlas, who was condemned by Zeus—for disobedience—to support the world on his shoulders. Map makers of the 16th century used a picture of him as a frontispiece in early collections of maps—and the tradition has endured. So that atlas you have—or should have—in your library actually goes back, in name, at least 6,000 years.

New atlases prove with indisputable figures and maps that since 1940 it is Russia that has been guilty of expansion in every direction—to the tune of over

Further, the pull of gravity varies from place to place over the earth and, despite the altitude at which missiles are flown, this would affect their flight path.

In brief, a long-range missile aimed at Detroit, Mich., might well wind up in Chicago or somewhere in Canada.

Using geometry and trigonometry, a mapmaker can survey a continent with considerable accuracy by building up a system of triangular measurements and then relating the whole to a single reference point. This country's marker is near Lucas, Kan.

The triangulation method cannot be carried across oceans because of the lack of fixed reference points. Thus, nobody knows exactly how far it is from New York to Paris. The error may be as much as 2000 feet.*

To illustrate the problems missile men are up against, the U. S. is now engaged in a gigantic map making project with

the cooperation of 17 Latin and South American countries. Already the surveyors have found a 125-mile-long range in Panama with 5000-foot peaks which do not exist on any map. Rivers have been found 40 miles out of place.

If this is true in the Western Hemisphere, you can imagine the margins of error over the vast and relatively unknown—to the U. S., anyhow—reaches of Russia and Asia.

It would be too much to say that nothing is known with precision of the interior of the Eurasian land mass.

The positions in Russia, however, could be triangulated only in relation to other points on the European and Asian land masses and not to positions in the U. S.—the oceans intervene, remember?

Unless the military have found ways as yet unknown generally, the conclusion is inescapable that *to shoot with reasonable accuracy at any target on the European or Asian continent, the missile bases would have to be located on that land mass.* (Italics added. See p. 3.—EDITORS.)

*Cartographers, or map makers, hope that by using satellites such as Explorers I and II, the size and shape of the earth can be determined more exactly.

The satellite would become a reference point in the skies, the point of a huge imaginary triangle, if it assumed an un-falling orbit and maintained an exact speed something none has done so far. If a perfect orbit is achieved, however, the mapmakers hope to be able to determine the positions of certain points on earth to within 50 feet.

Maps are Older than Babylon

one million square miles and 100 million people, exclusive of Red China. Conversely, the Western powers have steadily lost "colonies" through granting them self-rule and independence.

This latest use of the map to illustrate political coups is merely a further development of one of man's most useful tools. There are others. Terrain maps have proven indispensable to modern warfare. Special population maps are used by companies to plot their sales programs. Historical maps enable teachers and students to visualize the past. There are even maps of the earth's interior for miners and engineers.

Drawing pictures of sections of the earth is an old story. Older than writing, say experts, although no prehistoric maps survive. Cave dwellers

who found good hunting far from home undoubtedly scratched crude maps to remind them of the location, or told friends of the find by sketching a map in the earth with a twig. Our oldest map, a picture of a river valley baked on a clay tablet over 4,500 years ago, comes from Babylonia.

The Babylonians weren't the only ancients who drew maps. The Phoenicians, best sailors of their time, had them too. The lives of entire crews depended on the successful navigation of a vessel between rocks, around shallow spots and through narrow straits. A captain who learned of a safer route passed the information on via maps. Egyptians, whose very lives and fortunes pivoted on the Nile River, carefully charted its path and overflow.



Gerardus Mercator (left), a Dutch cartographer, added much to our knowledge of maps.

The Greeks, who gave us so much, contributed to our knowledge of maps too, despite some false starts. The 6th century B.C. philosopher Anaximander, for instance, thought the earth was a cylinder suspended in the middle of heaven.

Two hundred years later most Greeks believed the earth was round. It *had* to be, because the earth was the masterpiece of the gods, and the gods would naturally construct it in the most perfect of forms, the sphere.

More practically, the Greeks developed our longitude-latitude system, calculated the size of the earth and first spoke of poles, tropics and an equator.

The Romans—more warlike than the Greeks—needed maps for their military campaigns, and cartography flourished under the Emperors. Julius Caesar ordered a map of the entire Roman Empire in 44 B.C. which took 35 years to complete. It was finally delivered to his successor, Augustus.

But Romans tended to be the Texans of their time. The Empire was enlarged beyond all fact, with China and Russia drastically reduced to make room.

This form of exaggeration lasted through the Middle Ages. The Bible was followed literally by map makers who placed Jerusalem in the very center of the world and drew the Holy Land entirely out of proportion to the truth. East was placed on top of the map; even the exact location of Paradise was given!

After 1500, maps improved. The invention of the compass and better ships

encouraged exploration, so map makers had access to more accurate information. With the advent of printing and engraving, the laborious hand-drawn map was outmoded. Maps were mass-produced, cost less.

World globes became popular too. A standard pose for a portrait during the 16th century was that of a man solemnly measuring a globe with a drawing compass, looking terribly learned.

A pioneer globe maker and cartographer of the 16th century was the Dutchman, Gerardus Mercator. He not only took pains to collate information from books, older maps and personal interviews with sailors, but traveled widely himself.

His Mercator projection of the world—a system of vertical and horizontal lines sectioning the earth—exercised a powerful influence on the progress of navigation, although it did little to correct map distortion. Only a map drawn on or applied to a sphere, it seems, can give a true picture of the earth's surface.

While the Dutch added much to the progress of cartography, leadership in the field passed to the English in the 18th century. The Dutch were business men who made map for money; they turned them out quickly and except for Mercator, didn't worry about accuracy.

Under Queen Elizabeth, England's "Sea Dogs" voyaged all over the globe, bringing back detailed reports on foreign coastlines—and loot. England itself was

mapped county by county during her reign.

After 1750, wars broke out in Europe with awful regularity. Generals demanded accurate maps from their governments—and got them. Napoleon's victories were largely the result of carefully drawn maps. His final defeat prevented him from finishing his greatest project—a detailed map of all Europe.

As railroads penetrated into uncharted territories, there was a new need for better maps. Our own century, with its two global wars and shifting frontiers, demands ever improved maps. Airplane photography has largely solved the problem of penetrating the yet unmapped areas of the world.

And much of it is still unfamiliar territory—right now only one-fourth of the earth's surface is adequately mapped! But that 25 per cent is being mapped more accurately as each year passes, and maps are constantly being up-dated.

Therefore, by making our map more accurate, we lessen the chance of defeat in future wars.—PAUL K. MARTIN.

Atlantic Union Movement Advances in Canada, Iceland

Patrick Nicholson, well-known columnist and broadcaster, and a key Canadian sponsor for the *Declaration of Atlantic Unity*, has been elected a member of the North American Executive Board.

An Atlantic Union Committee of Iceland has been launched with the following executive members: Hon. Bjarni Benediktsson, M.P., former Minister for Foreign Affairs, signer of the Atlantic Pact; Dr. Gylfi Gislason, professor of economics and Minister of Education; Dr. Asmundur Guðmundsson, Bishop of Iceland; Hon. Haraldur Guðnason, Ambassador to Norway; Johann Hafstein, M.P., bank director, member of Standing Committee of NATO Parliamentary Conference; Dr. Alexander Johannesson, professor of philology, author, pioneer in commercial aviation, rector emeritus of the University of Iceland; Hersteinn Palsson, chief editor of *Visir*; and Haukur Snorrason, chief editor of *Tíminn*.

The first plenary meeting of the International Movement for Atlantic Union is planned for the first week of July in Paris.

To Bar a New Yalta

Atlantic Unity Needed to Prevent "Disengagement"

By STEPHEN BORSODY

ON THE EVE of the Geneva Conference in 1955, the Soviets sharply rebuffed the American suggestion that the problem of the satellite nations should be discussed at the summit. Angrily and confidently, Moscow retorted in a press communiqué on June 14, 1955: "It should be clear to all that no problem of the countries of Eastern Europe exists . . ."

The satellite problem, although obligingly stricken from the Geneva agenda, did not cease to exist. In 1956, revolutionary upheavals in Poland and Hungary gave lie to Moscow's confident contention. But, alas, the events of 1956 have also depressingly demonstrated that, except for slogans of liberation, no Western policy existed to support the captive nations in their craving for liberty.

In 1958, as we approach another summit meeting, the routine of 1955 seems to be repeating itself. Washington has listed again "the problem of the situation in the East European countries" as a desirable item of discussion at the summit. And Moscow, conveniently glossing over the evidence of 1956, has again claimed it had no knowledge of any problem in its satellite empire. In an aide-mémoire on March 24, 1958, the Kremlin flatly accused the U.S. of meddling in the internal affairs of the Central and East European states, an act which supposedly is "insulting to these states and unpermissible in international relations."

West's Weakness is Russia's Strength

The situation in Central and Eastern Europe, of course, has been brought about by flagrant violation of the Yalta agreements to which the U.S. and Great Britain were signatories. It is, therefore, neither insulting nor unpermissible that the U.S. should be concerned with the situation in Russia's satellite states. In view of past experiences, however, it may well be asked whether it is realistic to raise the satellites issue in the way

Washington has got the habit of doing. For it may well amount to nothing more than needling the Soviets, with no practical benefits whatsoever for the satellite nations.

No critic of American foreign policy, aware of the complexities of the satellite problem, could summarily condemn the Eisenhower Administration for not carrying out its own program of liberation. But the Eisenhower-Dulles policy was certainly guilty of reckless oversimplification, both by popularizing the belief that the wrong policy of the Democratic Administration caused the Soviet enslavement of Central Europe, and by raising groundless hopes, through promises of a better policy, for liberation. Neither enslavement nor liberation was that simple. The Eisenhower Administration did no service to the cause it professed to serve by viewing a complex international situation through the distorted glasses of political partisanship.

It would be idle speculation to brood over the lost opportunities of the past years. The fact is, however, that while the West, mostly by default of U.S. leadership, sank into a state of impotence, and while U.S. policy-makers indulged in wishful thinking about the Soviet system's approaching collapse, Russia built up a new position of strength.

With the emergence of Khrushchev as the new leader, the Soviets have successfully weathered the internal crisis precipitated by Stalin's death. With the divided West as a helpless onlooker, the Soviets have crushed the heroic Hungarian revolution. The trust the captive peoples had laid in the West has been crushed, too. And, with the technological progress the Soviets have achieved, Moscow seems to be more confident than ever that the East-West stalemate will

Mr. Borsody, a former Hungarian journalist and diplomat, now an American citizen, is professor of history at Chatham College, Pittsburgh, Pa. He revisited Central Europe in the summer of 1957 as a member of Columbia University Research Project on Hungary.

work to Russia's advantage in maintaining the status quo in Central Europe.

Moscow's determination to defend the Central European status quo has been expressed in unequivocal terms. Khrushchev stressed repeatedly that the German problem can be solved only by negotiations between the East and West German Governments without interference from other States. This means, in effect, that Moscow will not accept the Western formula of German unification through free elections which would result in the destruction of the East German Communist puppet government.

As for the satellite nations, Khrushchev took a no less uncompromising attitude by simply maintaining that there is nothing to talk about. Everything else that the Soviets have been saying about "easing the East-West tension," "ending the cold war," or "peaceful co-existence," has been based on the assumption that the Soviet positions in Central Europe would remain intact. Or, more exactly, if the sundry Soviet and satellite propositions for ending the cold war were to be accepted, the Soviets would even gain an added measure of protection of the status quo. This would be the effect of the so-called Polish Rapacki Plan for an atom-free zone in Central Europe — although the Poles might have suggested it in the hope for loosening the Soviet grip on Central Europe. It would also promote the final objective of Soviet policy—the destruction of NATO and the West European federalist efforts.

Kennan Program "Illusory"

Unfortunately, the "disengagement" currents, clamoring for a "realistic" reappraisal of Western policy, are playing into the hands of Moscow. The disengagement program, so impressively put forward by George F. Kennan and brilliantly seconded by Walter Lippmann, as well as other no less brilliant Western thinkers, is, no doubt, realistic in recognizing the German problem as the central issue of the East-West conflict in Europe.

Its dangerous illusion, however, is the familiar false assumption, made by a great many Western liberals, that the Soviet expansion in Europe was a sort of response to Western hostility, encirclement, containment and so on. They seem to forget that, to the Communists, expansion is a response, but al-

ways a realization of the historical process moving inevitably toward world communism. Hence the false conclusion of the disengagement advocates, who assume that relaxation, withdrawal, neutralization and so on, once practiced by the West, would be matched by responses of the same kind by the Soviets. A more likely result of Western disengagement in Central Europe would be disintegration of fragile Western unity on the one hand, and consolidation of Soviet and Communist domination over the eastern half of Europe on the other.

The popularity of the disengagement program should not be mistaken for its practicability as a means of attaining Russia's withdrawal from Europe. In fact, it looks as if the disengagement idea would owe its popularity to a growing Western willingness to acquiesce in Europe's permanent partition and to appease Russia. The theory of disengagement, to be sure, envisages mutual East-West military withdrawal from Central Europe. But the Russians may give to "disengagement" their particular brand of interpretation as they did to the Yalta agreements on "free elections." An eventual East-West agreement on disengagement may well become another Yalta—promising on paper and disappointing in practice.

The chief attraction of the disengage-

ment plan lies in its proposal to neutralize Germany. This appeals to many Europeans on both sides of the Iron Curtain. A great many Germans, the Social Democrats in particular, believe that neutralization is the only possible means to achieve national reunification. Meanwhile, outside Germany, neutralization is a soothing idea to those who fear the revival of German militarism.

In Poland and Czechoslovakia in particular, Communists as well as non-Communists regard German neutrality as the best safeguard of their national security within the present boundaries, while on the western side of the Iron Curtain neutralization appeals both to those who fear Germany and those who dislike American foreign policy.

Thus the popularity of disengagement is fed by both anti-German and anti-American sentiments. No wonder, therefore, that Soviet Russia lends a sympathetic ear. But, though Russia is expected to contribute its share to the success of this policy, it shows no willingness to give up anything that would endanger Communist rule and Soviet influence in Central and Eastern Europe.

The West has no reason to look confidently toward the outcome of disengagement. Should the present anti-German and anti-American currents which support the disengagement trend

prevail in Europe, then, the edifice of Western unity, NATO, as well as the European federalist movement, may be doomed. For, unless the U.S. is firmly tied to Europe, and the close partnership of Germany with the West continues, disintegration is inevitable.

Only a resolute U.S. leadership can forestall the impending catastrophe. Only the U.S. is in the position to stop the disengagement trend by engaging fully in the building of Western unity. Not merely by telling others what to do, as heretofore, but by taking the lead in developing NATO into a more advanced form of Atlantic unity.

Only such a bold initiative as this could restore the confidence of the free world in American ability to meet the challenge of Soviet Russia. Only through engaging themselves in the cause of freedom and union can the Western democracies save themselves—and help to expand the frontiers of freedom in Central Europe, in this crucial area of East-West struggle.

British Youth Study Atlantica

Senior youth groups in Britain—a country faced with many international difficulties—recently held a conference in Devon County to develop "larger loyalties" toward the Atlantic Community. Probably the first conference of its kind in the whole Atlantic area, it attracted much attention and may expand into a community-wide project.

About 200 students from six Devon grammar schools, most of whom expect to enter universities within a year, attended, along with representatives from NATO and the European Youth Campaign.

The conference centered on the concept of the Atlantic-European Community rather than on mere schemes for military, political or economic "cooperation." It studied historical background, political and strategic aspects, economic needs and organizations, cultural collaboration, and world relations.

Adults present found the teen-agers' discussion very stimulating, according to Melita Knowles of the *Christian Science Monitor*. The adults later formed a panel to which the pupils put questions on such subjects as: German rearmament, implications of the H-bomb, and economic aspects of union.



"... And the children were never heard from again."

Common Market in Danger?

A German Economic Report

THE FRENCH counter-proposals to the "Maudling Project"—which is the British version of a Free Trade Area—are contained in a French memorandum which thus far has not been published, but has leaked out bit by bit, and in which many people both in the United Kingdom and elsewhere see a deliberate attempt to prevent any Free Trade Area.

They have evidently engendered so much opposition even among fellow member countries in the European Economic Community (EEC) that a reconciliation of views with those countries has become necessary before any discussion takes place with the other members of Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC).

It is of course no secret that neither official France nor the French business community are particularly well disposed to the idea of a Free Trade Area including the whole of OEEC Europe. This applies above all to the British participation, the argument being that the U.K. by participating would enjoy the preferences both of the Commonwealth and of the Common Market, and would thereby achieve an exceptionally favorable competitive position, in face of which the French economy at all events would be left out in the cold.

These and similar arguments are not new; they have indeed already played their part at the formation of the EEC. At that time they were overcome only by dint of very far-reaching concessions to France, based ultimately on conviction that the political concept of the EEC justifies such economic sacrifices. That this political concept seems still to be in the foreground is confirmed by the identity of the people whom our [German] Federal Government appointed to leading EEC posts. Those people do not come from business circles, nor from the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs; representatives of our Foreign Office have been selected for the key positions open to us.

But behind the concept of a Free Trade Area, no matter from what national points of view it may be regarded, there is no such political idea. If there

is any alternative at all to the political idea of a United Europe of the Six, *it is that of the Atlantic Community* [italics added] — a concept which, even apart from its military aspect, certainly goes beyond a European Free Trade Area.


It is therefore difficult to believe that the idea underlying the French counter-proposals could have been to await a similar measure of special concessions from the potential partners, now standing outside the EEC, in a Free Trade Area that was to be regarded as something purely economic. The course of the negotiations to date points rather to the conclusion—confirmed by the fact that it has already been decided to postpone discussion of the French proposals—that the more probable object is simply to gain time.

The point is that, if the Free Trade Area is not established in its principles and basic features *within the next two months* [italics added], it will become technically impossible to realize its most essential component feature, that is to say to start the tariff reductions operating in harmony with the EEC tariff reductions that begin to take effect on Jan. 1, 1959.

The forms of discrimination which are feared by the other members of OEEC no less than by the non-European outside countries will then in the first place have to produce their effect, and thereby remove the bases of OEEC and of the European Payments Union (EPU). Switzerland, for its part, has already intimated that it is not prepared to agree to any prolongation of EPU beyond Dec. 31, 1958.

There would be little sense in now going into the pros and cons of the French proposals, since they will certainly undergo great changes in the course of negotiations with the other OEEC countries. It seems more important to form a quite matter-of-fact idea of what will happen if the Free Trade Area is not established within the time required for the measures to come into force in coordinated fashion on Jan. 1, 1959. That is a possibility which must unfortunately be taken into account; and it is one which the other OEEC countries are evidently facing in a more realistic manner than Western Germany, which in such an event would certainly be one of those hardest hit.

It would seem necessary to recall the session of the Ministerial Council of the OEEC, Feb. 12 to 14, 1957, when the Free Trade Area was under discussion as a supplement or alternative to the Common Market. At that time our Federal Minister for Economic Affairs Mr. Erhard said, in a statement of principle which attracted wide international



—Conrad, Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung

France: "Regardless of the cost, this nut must be cracked." A German view.

Who is Winning War of Words?

By THOMAS J. HAMILTON

United Nations Correspondent, New York Times

UNITED NATIONS, N.Y.

FOR MONTHS the propaganda battle over a summit conference was waged by means of letters exchanged between the American and Soviet heads of government, and the U.N. was left on the sidelines.

It may be assumed that the Soviet decision to complain to the Security Council against flights of American military aircraft "towards" the frontiers of the Soviet Union was motivated by the belief that nothing more was to be obtained by letter-writing.

In any event, the Soviet complaint, which the U.S. countered by asking the Security Council to approve the Western plan of aerial inspection of the Arctic regions, brought one more Soviet veto, and further depressed the West.

The disarmament-summit debate raises two closely connected but separate issues: Who is winning the propaganda battle? What are the prospects for any kind of agreement on any subject between the U.S. and the Soviet Union?

It is to be feared that the Soviet Union was ahead in the propaganda battle, at least until Mr. Sobolev cast his veto. Up to that point the resourceful men in the Kremlin had been quite successful in obscuring the fact that it was the Soviet Union, not anybody else, which brought disarmament negotiations to a halt by boycotting the Disarmament Commission.

The pretext for the boycott was the claim that there is a pro-Western majority in the Disarmament Commission, and that the Soviet Union could not be expected to come back until "parity" had been established—that is, the number of Communist and neutralist members on the Commission must equal the Western members.

This campaign entirely overlooked the fact that the U.S. and the other Western powers added 14 members to the Commission last Fall, raising the membership to 25, in an attempt to meet Soviet objections.

Actually, the demand reflected the cock-sureness prevailing in Moscow as a result of the Soviet lead in Sputniks and 5,000-mile missiles. It hoped that the overwhelming majority of the U.N. would reject this attempt at blackmail.

On the contrary, the termination of disarmament negotiations in the U.N. helped gain support for the accompanying Soviet demand for a summit meeting. When the U.S. tried to make arrangements for procedural meetings of the Disarmament Commission and the Security Council it met with no encouragement, since the majority felt that this would irritate the Soviet Union and reduce the prospects for a successful gathering at the summit.

Russian Propaganda Scores

The persistent objections raised by Mr. Dulles to a summit meeting then set the stage for two remarkable efforts by the Soviet propagandists: the unilateral cessation of nuclear bomb tests, and the complaint to the Security Council against flights of American aircraft.

As President Eisenhower observed, the test announcement was a propaganda gimmick. Since the Soviet Union reserved its right to resume the tests as soon as the current American series is finished, it was merely promising a suspension until it is ready for another series of its own.

There can be no question, however, of the effectiveness of the announcement in terms of propaganda. And, despite the overwhelming sentiment in the Security Council against the Soviet complaint on flights of American aircraft, that also was effective.

Despite all the safeguards taken by the Strategic Air Command, the rest of the world is only too conscious of the danger from flights of aircraft, loaded with nuclear bombs, in the neighborhood of anybody's frontier. The lurid publicity inspired by the U.S. Air Force on this subject did us a great disservice.

The U.S. counterproposal, under which the Security Council would have endorsed the Arctic inspection plan, was excellently conceived. But it remains to be seen whether it will undo the propaganda advantages that Russia has attained from its own announcements.

However, the important thing is not propaganda, but the prospects for an agreement between the two super-powers on disarmament or anything else. The outlook is certainly not encouraging: the Soviet unilateral announcement on tests seems to have eliminated the one item on which agreement might have been reached with relative ease, the Pentagon and the Atomic Energy Commission permitting.

What else is there for the U.S. and the Soviet Union to negotiate about? Not Germany, since the Soviet Union says this is a matter for the two German governments. Not the Rapacki plan for a nuclear-free zone in the two Germanys, Poland and Czechoslovakia—the U.S. has rejected that.

Is there anything to negotiate about in the Middle East? It would hardly seem so, since Nasser's ambitions coincide so neatly with the aims of the Soviet Union that it is hardly possible to imagine an improvement there. An embargo on arms to the Arab countries and Israel would be worth considering but for the obvious fact that the Soviet Union would insist upon cutting off shipments to Turkey and Iran as well.

The West, in fact, is confronted with a regime in Moscow which is so inflated with its scientific achievements that it appears unwilling to make concessions on any subject. It is galling to reflect that the Khrushchev government, which obviously wants negotiations only for the purpose of propaganda, has managed to convince a large proportion of the earth's inhabitants that its peaceful aims are being blocked in Washington.

But while the propaganda aspects are important, the important thing is the military, economic and political threat now confronting the Western powers. The foe is more powerful, and far more resourceful, than he was when he unleashed the Korean War eight years ago. The danger for the democratic world, which in the meantime has become a house divided against itself, is correspondingly greater.

June, 1958

attention, that the efforts to establish a European Free Trade Area followed automatically from the logic and consequences of what had so far occurred.

He said that the plan represented an organic and therefore sensible further development of the economic integration of Western Europe, and one which had become possible only because the OEEC had created the basis for it through the existing multi-lateralization of trade and payments. With special emphasis Minister Erhard went on to make clear that the idea of a Free Trade Area represented an objective which in itself was justified, and which allowed for the need—arising from the great developments in the field of technique and that of world politics—to create the broadest European market conceivable.

Largely under the impression of this statement the Conference abandoned the view of a Free Trade Area as a "supplement" or "alternative," and adopted the formula (originally Minister Erhard's) of a "functional" connection between the two. This placed clearly and unambiguously on record the fact that there is a link between the Common Market and the Free Trade Area. While at that time it still remained doubtful whether the EEC would come into existence, there was a general con-

vention that upon its doing so the Free Trade Area would necessarily have to be formed.

It is now desirable to recall that link. After all, if the Free Trade Area does not now come into existence after the periods set in the EEC treaty expire, a situation will then arise which no longer corresponds to the entire OEEC's declaration of intent as given in February 1957. That situation would force the Federal Republic of Germany to state clearly which way it chooses to go. The "ultimatum" [from] the British Paymaster General, Mr. Maudling, [delivered] in Paris on March 31, betokens the critical point now reached.

Prefer Wider Free Trade Area

The way of the Common Market without the Free Trade Area will lead, let there be no doubt about it, to liquidation of the OEEC and EPU. That means abandoning the principle of multilateral trade and payments throughout Europe, and consequently a relapse into bilateralism and mutual discrimination. That is to say, it means the opposite of the international trade in which our Federal Republic—like others—has more than once proclaimed its faith by solemn Government declarations.

There is no need to labor the point

that such a course of events in world economy and world politics would be the precise opposite of that intended. And it goes without saying that the Common Market of the Six could never compensate Western Germany for the world market, which now stands open to it precisely because of its consistently followed policy of liberalizing trade and payments. The EEC countries account for about 25 per cent of our total foreign trade, while trade with all the countries which might belong to the Free Trade Area accounts for roughly 70 per cent of it.

Any sacrifice of the Free Trade Area would therefore affect nearly a half of all Western Germany's external trade. We ought to recall the trouble and the hard struggles which the Federal Republic had to win back its place as a world trading nation; and we should clearly appreciate the result to which that trouble and those struggles have led. Then it will not be a matter of indifference to us whether the loss of this birth-right of a world trading nation is to be lightly risked for a mess of pottage in the shape of the Little European Market.—*The preceding article was originally published as Economic Review Number 24, by the Berliner Handels-Gesellschaft, a German banking house.*

U. S. Science Lags Politically

WHAT IS WRONG with American scientific education and how can it be remedied? My answer, I fear, will shock even sympathetic readers. Whatever is wrong with American scientific education has nothing to do with Soviet scientific achievements. American scientific education is just as good, if not better. There is no question that the United States at present has the scientists of sufficient quality and of sufficient number to keep the lead in weapons research. The sad fact, however, is that many of our ablest scientists have abandoned weapons research and allied fields. . . .

Why have so many of the best American scientists withdrawn from, or refused to engage in, weapons research? The easy answer is that they were driven away from such work by the demagogic activities of Senator Joseph McCarthy. . . . This answer will not

wash The major withdrawals from weapons research and from the entire national defense setup took place long before McCarthy achieved notoriety, long before the publicized cases of security bungling made headlines.

The withdrawal of American scientists from research on weapons of all types began shortly after Hiroshima. For many of the scientists, the use of the atomic bomb represented a crisis of conscience. Some had had doubts about the use of such weapons, but in the end realization that fascism threatened the survival of free institutions overrode their scruples. Both these scruples and the reflections which quieted them did the American scientists credit. But as soon as victory against fascism was assured, these scruples flared up again. They were never properly answered. Far and away the most important reason why so many scientists drifted away from defense work was the feeling that

the foreign policy of the U.S. was mistaken. The primary source of this mistake lay in what appeared to them to be the disastrously mistaken view that the Soviet Union was an aggressive totalitarian power. . . .

This failure to understand the nature of the Soviet threat, and the disastrous consequences of appeasement, did not flow from a concern with peace. . . .

The basic reason for American backwardness in present-day weapons research is the defects in the political education of American scientists. It is not the lack of technical scientific education which is the missing link in American education. The missing link is the inadequacy of the political education which most American scientists have received. This has prevented them from seeing that Communist totalitarianism is just as much an enemy of free institutions as fascism.—From "The Missing Link in American Science," by SIDNEY HOOK, in *The New Leader*.

WITH THE VACATION season at hand once again there is the perennial problem—for those who *don't* plan in advance—of where to go, what to do, in short, how best to get the most out of those two or three weeks of free time. But, for those who *do* plan in advance, one of the best solutions is to take a trip to Europe. And of the European countries, France is a "must" on nearly everyone's list.

To get the most out of a European and French jaunt, naturally it's wise to plan ahead, to make the necessary travel and hotel reservations so as to avoid disappointment. But once all the preliminaries are out of the way, and you've arrived in, say France, what can you expect to get for those dollars you've been hoarding all year.

Well, make no mistake, France has everything! There are countless places of breathtaking beauty. Food fit for a king is readily available; music—ranging from pre-Christian and medieval melodies to symphonies and "le hot jazz"—can be heard, and there are priceless works of art to be viewed.

From a scenic standpoint the five most popular regions of France, aside from Paris and the fabulous Riviera, are the Loire River Valley, where Renaissance châteaux can be found; the Pyrenees region of Southern France, where, at Lourdes, is located the famous cathedral and shrine; the French Alps region of Savoy is popular both in summer and winter. In the Provence may be found Roman ruins, the silk center of Lyon, and, to the south, the famous port of Marseille. Finally, there are the provinces of Normandy and Brittany, with the ancient Mont St. Michel lying midway between the two.

The music lover, be he a devotee of symphonies or "real cool" jazz, will find more than enough to titillate the most jaded appetite. Throughout the country, at summer festivals, folk-gatherings, concert halls, abbeys, and national and international celebrations, can be heard an endless variety of music. The monks at the abbeys of Saint-Pierre de Solesmes and Saint-Benoit-sur-Loire still sing the Gregorian chants written by medieval ecclesiastics. Auvergne musicians play pre-Christian melodies on ancient regional instruments such as the *vieille*. And in Paris, from October to mid-April, at least seven symphony orchestras play music loved by millions.



French Government Tourist Office

For a water-level view of Paris, one of the best ways is to take a ride on one of the *bateaux mouches*, which sail up and down the Seine. *Notre Dame* is in the background.

France Offers Tourists "Beaucoup"

By PAUL K. MARTIN

"Summer" festivals are usually held during the Spring and Summer in the provinces in quaint settings of town squares, ancient castles, Roman amphitheatres, and even prosaic concert halls. Some of the most popular are held at Aix-en-Provence, Menton, Strasbourg, Vichy, and Bordeaux. In Burgundy the festivals are combined with art and dramatic shows. The most famous festival is held at Prades in July where Pablo Casals has given his recitals since 1950.

In France one may see art forms ranging from prehistoric drawings in the caves in the Pyrenees and the Dordogne Valley, to Matisse canvases in the museum at his birthplace, Le Cateau. At Orange, Nimes and Arles the amateur archeologist can explore Roman ruins. For the student of medieval church architecture there are magnificent Gothic cathedrals at Chartres, Reims, Amiens, Laon, and, of course, in Paris there is the world-famous *Notre Dame*.

Tapestries are to be seen in Bayeux, Saumur and Beaune; porcelains in Limoges and Sevres; lace at Le Puy and Alencon, iron work at Rouen and artistic tapestries at Lyon.

Paris, however, has the greatest con-

centration of art in all of France. The Louvre, containing representative works of every artistic era, is the largest art museum in the world. Other Paris galleries specialize in works from eras such as the Renaissance, Romanesque, etc.

Examples of Celtic art are to be seen in Aix-en-Provence; early Christian art in Arles; Greek art in Avignon; medieval sculpture in Autun and religious art in Conques; 15th and 16th century Italian art in Ajaccio on the island of Corsica, Napoleon's birthplace. At Epinal, for a slight change of pace, you can see 16th century drawings which probably were the basis for comic book art. The list of art types and their locations is almost endless. There's enough for everyone, to satisfy every taste.

Many tourists, traveling on a limited budget, will be able to see only Paris and its environs. The best way to do this, according to the experts, is to book passage on a sightseeing bus or one of the *bateaux mouches*, which ply the Seine and give a water-level view of the city. For a real lowdown tour the French even provide tours of their famous sewer system, where Victor Hugo's Jean Valjean hid out from the gendarmes.

Museum fans have their place in France, too. The student of criminology can indulge himself at the Prefecture of Police, which has an exhibit of prints and engravings of prison life in France. Literary students may visit the Victor Hugo museum located in the building where the author of *Les Misérables* lived. There are over a hundred museums in Paris which feature such diverse things as tapestries, money, and the post-office. There's even a museum which depicts the history of dentistry.

To provide a change of pace from the museum and scenic wonders circuit, there are the night spots of Paris. Most of these are located in Montmartre and the Latin Quarter on the left bank of the Seine. One of the most famous of the nightclubs, *Le Bœuf sur le Toit*—The Steer on the Roof—has long been famous for its excellent entertainment.

"Guide Michelin" Essential

But for some tourists; France, with all its antiquities, its cathedrals and its beautiful scenery, is, above all, the land of excellent food and drink. Here the gourmet—and the gourmand—is in seventh heaven. The cuisine at inexpensive bistros and stylish restaurants in Paris is almost universally excellent. To enjoy a gastronomical tour of France one has but to buy a copy of the *Guide Michelin*. The book, actually a guide for travelers which indicates the highways, byways and places of interest, is probably most famous as a guide to the best restaurants of the country. With the book one can eat and drink his way through France, enjoying only the best of both.

To encourage tourists the French government has made many price concessions. By paying for their souvenirs in dollars, checks or travelers' checks they can realize an average saving of 15 per cent. A ten per cent saving can be had by paying for hotel bills and other services in dollars. These include tours, excursions and car rentals. During May, June, September or October—depending on the high point of the season—hotels in 19 mountain and sea resorts will reduce their rates from 20 to 40 per cent. Reductions of 33 per cent are available by buying special gas coupons, which can be used at any petrol station.

For the tourist, then, be he on a budget or not, France has a multitude of things to offer. In fact, as said before, France has everything!



Political Unions and History

POLITICAL COMMUNITY & THE NORTH ATLANTIC AREA, by S. A. Burrell, K. W. Deutsch, R. A. Kahn, M. Lee, Jr., M. Licherman, R. E. Lindgren, F. L. Loewenheim, & R. W. van Wagenen, Princeton Univ. Press, 230 pp., \$4.75.

WE KNOW TWO THINGS about war; one is that due to its present-day nature, it must be eliminated absolutely, put beyond serious possibility. The other is that in certain areas of the world, thanks to political organization (forming unions, etc.), among previously warring units, war has been eliminated, permanently for all practical purposes. If war can be eliminated by uniting the warring units into some type or other of political organization, it plainly suggests that there might be a tremendous value in conducting a large-scale study of history to find out how these security-communities were brought into being. It would be helpful to know what conditions are favorable to their development, and how they might be extended over larger areas of the globe.

It was just such a study as that which the A. W. Mellon Charitable and Educational Trust made a grant for in 1951. Basically, it was to study an ancient problem, the elimination of war. However, the research was to be conducted along lines never attempted before. A search was to be made for all of the instances that history contains of political mergers, unions and integrations of every sort between nations, the effect of which was to create a security-community. The object then was to learn how these integrations were promoted, how well they succeeded, why those which failed did so, etc. From all these cases it was then to be seen what parallels or analogies to present conditions might be suggested to the end of creating an integration of some sort

among the nations of the North Atlantic.

The authors have discovered some three dozen instances in history where nations have united in some manner or other to form what they term security-communities. For the purposes of this book, however, they have studied intensively only eight cases, ranging from the outright union of the 13 American states to the "pluralistic security-community" that exists between the United States and Canada. Although many cases are reviewed in this book which persons interested in promoting Atlantic Union might not consider relevant in present conditions, the authors have seen fit to bring under observation every type of integration among nations and peoples of which history gives us any account.

Some Beliefs Hard to Take

When it comes to conclusions drawn from all these cases and what these conclusions suggest as to forming an Atlantic Union, there will doubtless be some raised eyebrows among readers of this magazine. The authors express some beliefs that are a little hard for the faithful to swallow.

But for the benefit of those who see fit to disagree with them, the authors make plenty of allowances. They are anything but dogmatic in stating their conclusions; they are judging in the light of historical experience, and they are frank to say that history does not actually "repeat itself." In making deductions from historical data, the authors say, "the problem is not so much to find the facts as it is to decide what is essentially the same and what is essentially different between the historical facts and those of the present."

This book gives in some detail the background conditions which enabled such unions as the U.S., Switzerland, Germany, the Hapsburg Empire (until 1914) and others to be formed, also such pluralistic security-communities as Norway-Sweden today. In the light of

these historical experiences, the authors draw up a list of conditions which they regard as essential for the success of any type of integration, whether an out-and-out one such as the U.S., or a pluralistic one in which the legal independence of the separate governments is retained.

They then pass to the North Atlantic area and enumerate what they believe are the essential or helpful conditions for the launching of an Atlantic Union. Of these they find 14, and in respect to eight of these they find the countries in the North Atlantic rating high. As to the other six, they believe the countries rate rather low, but since 1945 there is evidence of improvement.

For example, a condition in which the area rates low is what the authors call "mutual responsiveness." By this is meant "sense of community." It is "a matter of mutual sympathy and loyalties; of 'we-feeling,' trust and consideration; of at least partial identification in terms of self-images and interests; of ability to predict each other's behavior and ability to act in accordance with that prediction. In short, a matter of perpetual attention, communication, perception of needs, and responses."

Another respect in which the North Atlantic area rates low, according to these findings, is in "expectation of joint economic rewards." The authors say they found no case of political union which was not preceded by widespread expectations of joint economic rewards for the participating units. Among businessmen, however, in the North Atlantic countries or among the decision-making groups they claim there is no awareness whatever of the widespread economic benefits which would come from an Atlantic Union.

They do realize that Clarence Streit, both in *Union Now* and in *Freedom Against Itself*, has called attention to economic gains expected from the great single market that a union would create. As for the populations in general, no such expectations exist, they say, and this is a serious lack. They quote several polls to support their views.

Based strictly on their historic findings, the authors wind up their book with some policy suggestions for groups and organizations that are trying to promote Atlantic Union. One of these is that the movement's objectives be watered down with a little pluralism, keeping complete union as an ultimate goal,

but accept pluralistic or functional compromises as stages of a journey. If this suggestion is not to the liking of all unionists, they will find others in this section which are exceedingly sound and acceptable.

Indeed, unionists should be deeply grateful for the great labor that has gone into the preparation of this book. Whether the authors' conclusions are invariably in accord with unionist assumptions is beside the point; it is vastly

heartening that in general they are. Besides, this book represents the first extensive inter-disciplinary study by a team of scholars into this great subject, a subject which may prove to be the paramount problem of the twentieth century. Those who regard Atlantic Union as a subject worthy of serious study as well as a project worthy of promotion, will find this a distinguished and stimulating book.

--LESTER B. VERNON
Beaver, Pa.

Here Roper Gives His Own Answers

YOU AND YOUR LEADERS, by Elmo Roper, William Morrow & Co., N. Y. 277 pp., \$3.95.

EIGHT YEARS AGO in San Francisco I had the pleasure of interviewing Elmo Roper on the radio. At that time, I suggested that people always asked Mr. Roper what the public thought and that just for once I would like to ask him what Elmo Roper thought. Now he has published a book, and to my great satisfaction, I find that it contains answers to both questions.

Specifically, the book is about Roosevelt, Willkie, Stevenson, Truman, Taft, Dewey, Eisenhower, Marshall and MacArthur. It deals with what the public thought about these men personally, what the public thought about the policies of these men—often a very different reaction, and the judgment of the man responsible for the questions.

This book is really the inside story of history as it was made, but its interest will certainly not be limited to the historian. There are lessons in it for the politician, political scientist, sociologist, psychologist, and perhaps above all for those people everywhere who are interested in a republican form of government and how it works. Considering the apparent bases for some of the decisions reached by the public, some might be inclined to add, "and why it works." Many people, however, will enjoy **YOU AND YOUR LEADERS** not as students of any particular kind, but as readers who enjoy a fascinating story well told.

Most of us have had the experience of picking up a book and finding that we could not put it down once we had started to read it. That is a rare treat, but it is doubly so when the book is serious non-fiction. It is not that good

fiction is more interesting than good non-fiction. It is more probable that good fiction has a plot which intrigues us, and we do not want to put the book down until we have come to the end.

Mr. Roper presents a study of the attitudes of Americans toward some of their top leaders over a period of years. These attitudes have been measured by means of public opinion surveys which have been conducted by the Roper organization. The attitudes of the American citizens have been supplemented here and there by the personal observations of the author from his close association with a number of these leaders.

One would not expect a study of this sort to form a narrative—certainly not the type of narrative that the reader would feel he could not put aside until he had come to the end. It is hard to see how a narrative could be constructed out of a series of figures and observations extending from 1936 to 1956, and yet the author has managed just this, and more. When the reader has finished the narrative he is able to put down the book only because there is no more to read. It is an intimate story of the American people, their likes, dislikes, fears and apprehensions. That story can have no end, and reading the account of this brief period of recent American history, one can only hope that volumes two, three and four will be forthcoming. It is frustrating to come to the end of the book and not know what is going to happen next.

For years, Mr. Roper has been outspoken in his beliefs that the principal value of public opinion surveys lies not in finding out what decisions the public has made about a given subject or candidate but in finding out *why* the public

has come to these decisions. In the very short conclusion to his book he states this conviction clearly: "It is one thing to have the tools to gauge public opinion accurately and another to use this knowledge intelligently and for the betterment of mankind. It would be a bad day indeed for this country if our statesmen were to follow slavishly the voice of the majority as if it were the word of God."

Never before to my knowledge has the reader been given such an intimate look at the democratic process and how it works.

JUSTIN BLACKWELDER

Washington, D. C.

Votes and Voters

BALLOT POSITION & VOTER'S CHOICE, by Henry M. Bain, Jr., & Donald S. Hecock, Wayne State Univ., Detroit, Mich., \$1.75.

THE INTRIGUING SUBTITLE of this first political science number in the Wayne State University Studies is: "The Arrangement of Names on the Ballot and Its Effect on the Voter." As V. O. Key, the eminent Professor of Government at Harvard, notes in the foreword, the authors' pioneering study suggests a needed reform in our election machinery too easily overlooked.

From painstaking scientific analysis of a recent primary in Michigan—involved such mathematical mysteries as *rho* (rank order correlation coefficient)—several conclusions are drawn. Voters do tend to favor the first position on the ballot (less frequently, the last position), but, contrary to general expectations, position is not a more important factor on voting machines than on paper ballots (the machines can rotate position only by each precinct, rather than by each ballot). Position effect, which particularly influences the ignorant or uninformed voter, can thus be decisive in even a fairly close election and represents a flaw in our democratic process. Actually about half the states—not a single one in the South—provide for rotation of ballot position.

The authors recommend a short and legible ballot, and scrambling, rather than mere rotation, of the names thereon. Finally they warn against "getting out the vote" as a political end in itself. To "get out the vote," without interesting or informing the public, merely

The Council of the Atlantic Union Committee lost an outstanding member through the recent death of John Strider Coleman, president of the Burroughs Corporation, the Detroit Board of Commerce, and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. He was a champion of lower tariffs and, as an ultimate goal, free trade. As an organizer of the American contingent of the Rilderberg Group, as well as a member of the AUC Council, he was an Atlantic pioneer. His contribution to its development was beyond measuring. His death is a heavy blow to all the forces of Atlantic integration.

The Atlantic Union Committee also mourns the recent deaths of Council members William V. Griffin, New York City, former president of the English-Speaking Union; and Dr. Gordon Keith Chalmers, president of Kenyon College, Ohio; and one of its supporters in the U.S. Senate, W. Kerr Scott of North Carolina.

New AUC Council members included Dr. David B. Steinman, New York consulting engineer, who built the "impossible" project, the Mackinac Straits Bridge. That "impossible-to-finance" undertaking, incidentally, was financed thanks to the herculean efforts of former U.S. Senator Prentiss M. Brown, long a member of the AUC Council. Other new Council members are:

Mrs. EUGENIE M. ANDERSON, former Ambassador to Denmark, Red Wing, Minn.

DR. HARVIE BRANSCOMB, Chancellor, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, Tenn.

CASS CANFIELD, Chairman of the Editorial Board, Harper & Bros., New York City.

DR. RALPH B. DRAUGHON, President, Alabama Polytechnic Institute, Auburn, Ala.

increases the uninformed vote. Surely this study is a salutary reminder that nothing can be too small to be overlooked in a democracy where "eternal vigilance" is still the price to be paid for our liberty.

—J. WINFIELD QUALIS
Vanderbilt University,
Nashville, Tenn.

Atlantic Council Gains and Losses

JOHN W. EICHLEAY, Eichleay Corporation, Pittsburgh, Pa.

IRVING M. ENGEL, President, American Jewish Committee, and Attorney, New York City.

DR. LAURENCE M. GOULD, President, Carleton College, Northfield, Minn.

DR. JOSEPH KAPLAN, Chairman of the U.S. International Geophysical Year, Institute of Geophysics, University of California, Los Angeles.

HON. HERBERT H. LEHMAN, former U.S. Senator, New York City.

DAVID J. McDONALD, President, United Steelworkers of America, Pittsburgh, Pa.

DR. JAMES H. NEWMAN, Executive Vice President, University of Alabama.

DR. ETHAN A. H. SHEPLEY, Chancellor, Washington University, St. Louis, Mo.

PHILIP SPORN, President and Director, American Gas and Electric Company, New York City.

Council members Eugenie Anderson and Hazel Palmer, president of the National Federation of Business and Professional Women's Clubs, are candidates for nomination for the U.S. Senate from Minnesota and Missouri, respectively. Two other Council members have also achieved these distinctions:

George W. Healy, Jr., editor of the *New Orleans Times-Picayune* was recently elected president of the American Society of Newspaper Editors.

Dr. Edward Teller, "Father of the H-bomb," has been awarded the Albert Einstein Medal and Award as "an outstanding contributor to human knowledge in the natural sciences."

Quo-Quiz Answers

All the following page citations refer to Union Now, postwar edition (Harpers).

1. Senator Estes Kefauver, 1948 (p. xi.).
2. President U. S. Grant, 1873 (p. 31.).
3. Herbert Hoover, 1919 (p. 42.).
4. Isaiah, 65: 3-17 (p. 163.).
5. Jefferson, 1776 (p. 6.).
6. Lord Lothian, 1938 (p. 53.).
7. Lionel Curtis, *The Commonwealth of God*, 1936 (p. 84.).
8. Lord Acton, *History of Freedom*, 1877 (p. 89.).
9. Hitler (p. 91.).
10. Thomas Paine (p. 92.).



Electrification Plus Bolshevism

At the Party meeting in Semenovskoye, near Sverdlovsk, a Moscow propagandist was explaining to the comrades that the production of electric power in Siberia in 1960 would be greater than that of all Western Europe combined. "Well, Comrade," Tomil Danilovitch complained, "that is good, very good, but what does it mean to us small citizens? Will we get more petroleum for our household lamps then?"

"You weakling," said the Party man angrily. "What a stupid question. If you should run out of petroleum, you have just to go to the wall, turn the switch and you will have light—until the next shipment of petroleum finally reaches Semenovskoye!"

Cock o' the Roost

The young men of the village decided to play a joke on Nasreddin Hoja (a 13th century scholar). They invited him to the *hamam* or public bath, and when they were all washed and were resting, wrapped up in their long bathrobes, one of them said: "Hoja, we shall all try to lay an egg each, and he who fails to do so will have to foot the whole bill today."

Thereupon, they all squattered down on the floor, began to cackle, and produced each an egg which they had brought with them into the *hamam*. But Nasreddin Hoja, who was never at a loss for an answer, began to flap his arms,

and crowing lustily, he said: "There couldn't possibly be so many hens together without there being also a cock."

Stone-Cold Dead in de Market Place

The local magistrate's court in Brighton, England, recently sentenced a young gentleman to one day in prison for disorderly conduct. When arrested the young man was talking loudly and excitedly to Queen Victoria's statue in the town square. The magistrate's verdict, in part, specified: "A gentleman does not speak to a lady who is not able to answer."



"Each fifth bull in the arena suffers from nervous tension, and each 15th is completely crazy. This proportion is even higher among torreadors," declared the Spanish psychologist, Dr. Carlos Mendoza.

The Good Black Times

The New York Times recently distributed a supplement aimed at gaining new subscribers. On its front page was reproduced—life-size—a page one of the *Times* of April 16, 1912 . . . devoted entirely (with one exception) to reporting the sinking of the *Titanic* the previous day. The exception was a six-inch band of white space framed in heavy black lines, which cut across the 1912 page, a little below a huge picture of the doomed ship. On this band in big letters was the headline:

**This supplement shows
the kind of reading enjoyment
you'll find every day
in *The New York Times***

An Italian innkeeper, anticipating a large influx of tourists, sent out the following promotional literature to travel agencies: "Daily pension only 1,500 lire, lovely rooms, first-class food, and full use of personnel."



The Search

At one of the usual ideological 'People's Education Courses' for factory and office workers in Budapest, a student by the name of Kovacs arose and questioned the party official, who had just finished his lecture concerning the manifold blessings of a Communist economic system. He asked: "I have only three questions for the Comrade Lecturer. We are one of the richest wheat countries in Europe, but where is all our flour? We are one of the largest cattle-raising countries, but where is our milk and butter? For centuries we have produced the best Tokay wine, but where is it all today?"

The lecturing party official looked at the clock and said, "It is too late today, Comrade. I will answer your three questions exhaustively after the next lecture."

A week later, following the lecture, the student Szabo stood up and said, "I have only one question, Comrade Lecturer. Please tell us where Comrade Kovacs is today?"

Cleanliness is Next to Godliness


Sean McRory, a Sligo, Eire, inventor, claimed he could run an automobile on after-shave lotion instead of petrol. He arranged a public demonstration but unfortunately the engine never started.

"Never you mind, Sean," said the parish priest. "What if your auto doesn't move? It has the cleanest smelling motor in all of Eire!"



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You get a **BONUS MILE** for every 4 you drive with this new 3-T Nylon Cord Tire!



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Look! 1,000 tortuous runs over jagged rocks could not break Goodyear's triple-tough 3-T Nylon Cord. Reason: This nylon cord is triple-tempered under precise tension, at closely controlled temperature, for an exact period of time.

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NEW **3-T** NYLON CUSTOM TUBELESS SUPER-CUSHION

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MORE PEOPLE RIDE ON GOODYEAR TIRES THAN ON ANY OTHER KIND!

